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NRSRO Nullification 
WHY RATINGS REFORM MAY BE IN PERIL 
Jason W. Parsont† 
[O]ne strategic move might be made by the Big Three 
[Moody’s, S&P and Fitch] that would destabilize the status 
quo: they could decide to surrender their NRSRO status, and 
thereby avoid the more demanding provisions of the Dodd-
Frank Act, which only apply to NRSROs. . . . [W]hen the 
burdens outweigh the benefits, it makes sense for them to 
abandon NRSRO status—if they can.1 
INTRODUCTION 
In the words of Senator Christopher Dodd, Congress has 
“spent an inordinate amount of time on the rating agency 
question.”2 Scholars too have been deeply engaged in answering 
this question and so have market participants, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), and others.  
The rating-agency question asks whether there is a 
regulatory mechanism that can be adopted to encourage the 
credit rating agencies (CRAs)—including those that are 
nationally recognized statistical rating organizations 
(NRSROs)3—to produce more accurate credit ratings on debt 
securities, or whether another assessment of credit risk exists 
  
 † Careers-in-Law-Teaching Fellow, Columbia Law School, J.D. For helpful 
comments on earlier drafts, I am grateful to Frank Partnoy, Claire Hill, Paul Mahoney, 
Victor Goldberg, Dan Dunson, Ari Blaut, Jordan Abramson, Jonathan Schalit, Yuliya 
Guseva, Irene Ten Cate, Elizabeth Sepper, Aarthi Anand, Jennifer Sheridan and all 
other participants in the Associates’ and Fellows’ Workshop at Columbia Law School. I 
am also grateful to John Coffee and Charles Whitehead for their important advice and 
for the support of friends and family.  
 1 John C. Coffee Jr., Ratings Reform: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 1 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 231, 264 (2011).  
 2 156 CONG. REC. S3664, 3677 (daily ed. May 13, 2010) (statement of Sen. 
Christopher Dodd).  
 3 “NRSROs,” as used herein, mean those ten CRAs, such as Moody’s, S&P, 
and Fitch (the Big Three), that are registered with and regulated by the SEC. See 
Commission Orders Granting NRSRO Registration, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/ratingagency.htm (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2012). For the legal definitions of CRA and NRSRO, see Sections 3(a)(61) and 
(62) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(61), (62) (West 2011). 
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that could replace the need for credit ratings. Recently, 
Congress found that inaccurate credit ratings on a type of debt 
security—structured-finance products,4 such as subprime 
residential mortgage-backed securities and collateralized-debt 
obligations (CDOs)—significantly contributed to the 
mismanagement of risk by investors during the financial crisis 
of 2008.5 This, in turn, was a root cause of the crisis.6  
Given the close scrutiny that has been devoted to this 
question, including Congress’s recent legislative solution 
(collectively, Ratings Reform),7 this article’s purpose is not to 
propose a new answer, but to help refine the proposed answers. 
It tackles a fundamental problem that has the potential to cause 
any regulatory solution to the rating-agency question to 
crumble: “NRSRO Nullification,” which is the exercise of the 
NRSROs’ right to voluntarily withdraw from the regulatory 
regime.8 Such action would undermine, if not completely nullify, 
Ratings Reform and any future regulatory solutions. The 
concept of NRSRO Nullification also encompasses the exercise of 
the corollary right of the approximately seventy-six unregulated 
CRAs (non-NRSROs)9 to refrain from registering and thereby 
avoid the regulatory framework governing NRSROs.10 
Ratings Reform was a compromise between the views of 
two competing camps—the Free Market Camp and the Reform 
  
 4 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act defines 
“structured finance product” as “an asset-backed security, as defined in section 3(a)(77) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as added by section 941, and any structured 
product based on an asset-backed security, as determined by the Commission, by rule.” 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 939F(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1889 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank]. 
 5 See infra note 66. 
 6 See infra note 69. 
 7 “Ratings Reform,” as used herein, means (1) Dodd-Frank, (2) the Credit 
Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327 (2006) 
[hereinafter CRARA], and (3) the rules and regulations adopted thereunder. 
 8 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15E(e)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-7(e)(1) 
(West 2011) (“[An NRSRO] may . . . withdraw from registration by furnishing a written 
notice of withdrawal to the Commission”); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-1(g) (2011) (the 
related withdrawal rule). 
 9 By one recent estimate, there are approximately seventy-six non-NRSROs 
in the world, which figure includes some foreign affiliates of NRSROs. See Credit Rating 
Agencies: (The Full Global List), DEFAULTRISK.COM, http://www.defaultrisk.com/rating_ 
agencies.htm (last modified Oct. 2011). Another estimate, from 1999, puts this number 
at about 130. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF 
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKET 37 n.98 (2003) 
[hereinafter SEC REPORT OF 2003] (citations omitted). 
 10 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-7(a) (setting forth the right of CRAs to voluntarily 
register, or refrain from registering, as NRSROs). 
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Camp.11 The Free Market Camp generally advocates 
deregulation and replacing credit ratings with market 
measures or a professional-judgment analysis as the solution to 
the rating-agency question.12 Its goal is to decrease reliance on 
credit ratings. The Reform Camp, on the other hand, generally 
advocates closer regulation—including purging destructive 
conflicts of interest—to improve the accuracy and reliability of 
credit ratings.13 While Ratings Reform may have been a 
compromise, the thrust of the combined legislation favors the 
Reform Camp’s solution due to its emphasis on using 
regulation and oversight to improve the quality of credit 
ratings, even as it seeks to deemphasize their importance.  
The prospect of NRSRO Nullification is thus most 
problematic for those in the Reform Camp (including this 
author), because it would permit the NRSROs to foil Congress’s 
intent. In its most drastic form, all ten NRSROs could exercise 
their withdrawal right, which would precipitate de facto 
deregulation. It would be more likely, however, that only the 
seven smallest NRSROs14 would exercise this right, which 
would return the regulated club to only the Big Three—
Moody’s, S&P and Fitch.15 Either result would deprive society of 
a regulatory mechanism to effectively promote accurate and 
reliable ratings. In the absence of regulation, there would be no 
way to collect comparative performance data, manage or 
prohibit conflicts of interest, or realign incentives so that 
accurate ratings—instead of issuer-friendly ratings—would 
serve the NRSROs’ best business interests. If such regulation 
only applied to the Big Three, then the comparative data set 
and controls would be confined to this group, and there would 
be significantly less incentive to compete over accuracy. While 
some in the Free Market Camp might welcome NRSRO 
Nullification,16 they too should be wary since market 
  
 11 See Coffee, supra note 1, at 246 (identifying the two camps of reformers); 
see also infra note 63. 
 12 See infra Part I.C. 
 13 See infra Part I.C. 
 14 The seven smallest NRSROs are A.M. Best Co. (A.M. Best), Dominion 
Bond Rating Service Limited (DBRS), Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Inc. (Kroll), Japan 
Credit Rating Agency (JCR), Rating and Investment Information (R&I), Egan-Jones 
Ratings Company (Egan-Jones), and Morningstar Credit Ratings (Morningstar). See 
infra notes 64, 102, 142. 
 15 The Big Three are Moody’s Investors Services, Inc. (Moody’s), Standard & 
Poor’s Financial Services LLC, a subsidiary of The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. (S&P), 
and Fitch, Inc., Fitch Ratings Ltd., and its subsidiaries (Fitch). See infra Part III.A.3.  
 16 See Lawrence J. White, A New Law for the Bond Rating Industry, SEC. & INV., 
Spring 2007, at 52, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv30n1/v30n1-3.pdf 
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participants will continue to rely on NRSRO ratings in the near 
term irrespective of congressional action seeking to decrease 
reliance on them.17  
NRSRO Nullification, moreover, is realistic for at least 
some subset of the regulated club, because Ratings Reform has 
substantially increased the burdens of regulation vis-à-vis the 
benefits.18 Indeed, this is precisely the reason some non-
NRSROs have refrained from registering and some NRSROs 
have stopped rating structured-finance products or curtailed 
plans to expand.19 Since the NRSROs are only subjected to 
Ratings Reform if they consent, there is a fragile equilibrium 
that must be maintained between the benefits and burdens of 
NRSRO status.20 The resolution of the two most critical 
unresolved aspects of Ratings Reform—the Franken Proposal21 
and the new standards of creditworthiness22—will impact this 
equilibrium. To the extent the final form of these items 
continues to increase NRSRO-specific burdens without 
providing NRSRO-specific benefits, such measures could tip 
the balance toward NRSRO Nullification, especially for the 
seven smallest NRSROs.23  
The final form of these items could also prevent NRSRO 
Nullification if such items provide sufficient benefits to avoid 
the tipping point. The Franken Proposal’s CRA Board,24 which 
would act as both a “rater” of the NRSROs and an allocator of 
  
(characterizing abandonment of the entire NRSRO regulatory regime as “an unrealistic 
pipedream” that would nonetheless be a preferable solution).  
 17 See Claire A. Hill, Limits of Dodd-Frank’s Rating Agency Reform, 15 CHAP. 
L. REV. 133, 144 (2011) (“[P]eople will continue to be influenced by the agencies . . . no 
matter what the government does . . . . [So] it behooves government to make them 
better if at all possible.”); see also 156 CONG. REC. S3955, 3956 (daily ed. May 19, 2010) 
(statement of Sen. Al Franken) (“Here is the problem. Eliminating federally mandated 
reliance on NRSRO credit ratings doesn’t change the fact that State laws, pension fund 
policies, and other private market actors will still explicitly rely on NRSRO ratings.”).  
 18 For a description of how the benefits and burdens of NRSRO status have 
changed over three different periods, see infra Part II.  
 19 See infra notes 229-30 and accompanying text.  
 20 Professor Coffee recently alluded to this problem by suggesting that the 
Big Three might strategically abandon their NRSRO status to avoid the more 
demanding provisions of Ratings Reform if the burdens were to outweigh the benefits. 
See supra note 1 and accompanying text. I distinguish my claim by suggesting the 
more likely problem is that the other seven NRSROs would surrender their NRSRO 
status for precisely this reason while the Big Three would remain. 
 21 See infra Part III.A.1. 
 22 See infra Part III.A.2. 
 23 Based on today’s existing distinctions between NRSRO and non-NRSRO 
status, it appears that the smallest seven would be more likely to opt out of the 
regulatory regime than the Big Three. See infra Part III.A.3. 
 24 See infra notes 235-40 and accompanying text (describing the mechanics of 
the CRA Board).  
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initial (but not secondary) rating assignments, is a potential 
solution for keeping the NRSROs voluntarily regulated while 
also maximizing accurate and reliable ratings. Through its rating 
function, the CRA Board could provide a reliable signal to the 
market about the best-performing NRSROs over time. If the new 
standards of creditworthiness permit investment fiduciaries25 to 
optionally rely on credit ratings, such a signal could significantly 
influence the preferences that such fiduciaries have regarding 
CRAs. Through its allocating function, the CRA Board could also 
reward good performance with increased market share. While 
both functions have the potential to create competition over 
accuracy, the allocating function may be premature because 
there is currently no definition of accuracy that the market 
accepts. My central recommendation,26 which would only put into 
place the Franken Proposal’s rating function, seeks to address 
this problem as part of a broader goal of finding an optimal 
mechanism to address both the rating-agency question and 
NRSRO Nullification together. 
While this article also considers closing the voluntary 
registration loophole by having Congress adopt a mandatory 
registration requirement as an alternate way to prevent or 
reverse NRSRO Nullification,27 the article concludes that doing 
so is not necessary if my central recommendation is adopted.28 
There is also recent precedent demonstrating that the 
NRSROs would be willing to foil Congress’s intent. As part of 
Dodd-Frank, Congress sought to impose negligence exposure 
under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 on the NRSROs 
for misleading ratings disclosed in a registration statement.29 
The NRSROs had historically not been subject to negligence—
only recklessness—because of a safe harbor, known as Rule 
  
 25 “Investment fiduciaries,” as used herein, means those persons (such as a 
fund’s board of directors and investment advisor) responsible for determining 
creditworthiness, whether or not under the new standards of creditworthiness, at their 
respective institutions (e.g., broker-dealers, funds, banks, insurance companies, etc.).  
 26 See infra Part IV. 
 27 See infra Part III.B. 
 28 See infra Part IV.C. 
 29 See Dodd-Frank § 939G (“Rule 436(g) . . . shall have no force or effect.”); see 
House-Senate Conference Committee Holds a Meeting on the Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, FIN. MARKETS REG. WIRE, June 15, 2010 (statement of Rep. 
Mary Jo Kilroy) (“Included in the House offer is a simple commonsense proposal that 
will help change this dynamic, a proposal that would nullify SEC Rule 436(g) and hold 
all [CRAs] accountable under Section 11 liability, a standard which already covers 
many experts in the financial world—accountants, auditors, lawyers, investment 
bankers and the directors, officers and executives of the issuer.”).  
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436(g), that shielded them from such exposure.30 Congress did 
not, however, repeal the NRSROs’ existing right to withhold 
consent to negligence exposure.31 Thus, the NRSROs 
collectively withheld consent shortly after Dodd-Frank passed 
and thereby nullified the intent of Congress.32 While it is 
troubling that the NRSROs escaped negligence exposure in this 
manner, NRSRO Nullification would pose a significantly larger 
problem because it would allow an escape not just from 
negligence exposure but from the entire regulatory regime. 
While it would be headline news if the Big Three left the 
regulated club, few words would likely be uttered if the other 
seven surrendered their NRSRO status.  
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides 
background to the rating-agency question by discussing what 
credit ratings are and what it means for them to be inaccurate 
when made. It then describes the debate over the rating-agency 
question and the ultimate shape of Ratings Reform. Part II 
examines the question of why a CRA would want to be an 
NRSRO. It describes the benefits and burdens of being an 
NRSRO prior to 2006 and in the aftermath of Congress’s two 
recent attempts at Ratings Reform, the Credit Rating Agency 
Reform Act of 2006 (CRARA)33 and Dodd-Frank.34 It shows that 
being an NRSRO has become significantly less attractive over 
time. Part III identifies and discusses the financial and 
reputational implications that today’s most critical unresolved 
items—the Franken Proposal and the new standards of 
creditworthiness—will have on the NRSROs’ decision to 
withdraw from Ratings Reform. It then assesses the impact that 
today’s existing distinctions in concert with such unresolved 
items will have on this decision and the legal implications of 
NRSRO Nullification. This part also assesses the extent to 
which such items and their alternatives will promote accurate 
  
 30 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g) (2009). 
 31 Securities Act of 1933 § 7(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77g(a) (West 2010) (“If . . . any 
person [e.g., an NRSRO] whose profession gives authority to a statement made by him 
[e.g., a credit rating], is named as having prepared or certified any part of the 
registration statement . . . the written consent of such person shall be filed with the 
registration statement.”). 
 32 See Ford Motor Credit Company LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, Item No. 1120 
(Regulation AB) (Nov. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Ford No-Action Letter], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2010/ford072210-1120.htm (“[T]he rating 
agencies indicated that they were not willing to provide their consent . . . .”). 
 33 See CRARA, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327, 1329 (2006) (adding 
Section 15E “Registration of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations” 
to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-7).  
 34 Dodd-Frank, Title IX, Subtitle C. 
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and reliable ratings. It concludes that certain proposals for 
resolving these items would be more likely to tip the balance 
toward NRSRO Nullification, while other proposals would be 
more likely to prevent this result, and that the smaller seven are 
more likely to opt out of Ratings Reform than the Big Three. 
In Part IV, I present my central recommendation for 
resolving the Franken Proposal and new standards of 
creditworthiness in consonance with the dual goals of 
promoting accurate and reliable ratings and preventing 
NRSRO Nullification—adopt a refined version of the rating 
function suggested by the Franken Proposal, but not the 
allocating function. In addition, adopt the SEC’s current 
proposal to permit partial reliance by investment fiduciaries on 
any credit ratings under the new standards of creditworthiness 
subject to one additional requirement: investment fiduciaries 
seeking to rely on NRSROs that the rater deems good 
performers must certify agreement with the rater’s 
methodology for defining accuracy, while investment 
fiduciaries seeking to rely on non-NRSROs or NRSROs that the 
rater deems poor performers must publicly explain their 
disagreement with the rater’s methodology or show why certain 
non-NRSROs, when compared with NRSROs, produce ratings 
of equal or better quality. Under this proposal, it will not be 
necessary to close the voluntary registration loophole through a 
mandatory registration requirement. 
I. THE RATING-AGENCY QUESTION 
This part provides background to the rating-agency 
question by discussing what credit ratings are and what it 
means for them to be inaccurate when made. Then it describes 
the debate over the rating-agency question and Congress’s 
Ratings Reform solution.  
A. What Are Credit Ratings? 
Credit ratings are letter- and number-based 
assessments of risk that are “designed to measure and predict 
the probability of default, or the expected loss . . . for an 
individual debt obligation or for an obligor.”35 The ratings scales 
  
 35 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT ON NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED 
STATISTICAL RATING ORGANIZATIONS 9 (2011) [hereinafter SEC 2011 ANNUAL REPORT], 
available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/ratingagency/nrsroannrep0111.pdf.  
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typically range from triple-A (denoted by S&P and Fitch as 
“AAA” and by Moody’s as “Aaa”)—which represents the least 
risk of default—to C or D, which represents default or high 
vulnerability to default.36 Ratings that fall within the four 
highest categories assigned (typically “Baa3,” “BBB-” or higher) 
are known as “investment grade,” while lower ratings are 
known as non-investment grade (sometimes referred to as 
speculative, high-yield, or junk). The chart on the following 
page provides a comparison of the Big Three’s long-term credit 
ratings for individual debt obligations. 
The CRAs characterize these symbols as forward-
looking opinions37 and not as guarantees of future performance. 
Moody’s states that the CRAs “do not predict which specific 
bonds within a category are expected to default. Rather, credit 
ratings communicate that the higher the rating category, the 
lower the expected frequency of default.”38  
Since ratings are predictions about future risk and are 
not hard-and-fast facts, a credit rating should not be considered 
inaccurate when made simply because the rated security 
performed worse than expected. Good-faith predictions of 
future risk frequently prove wrong.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 36 See, e.g., MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., RATING SYMBOLS AND DEFINITIONS (2011), 
available at http://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_79004; 
Credit Rating Definitions & FAQs, STANDARD & POOR’S, http://www.standardandpoors.com/ 
ratings/definitions-and-faqs/en/us (last visited Mar. 3, 2012); FITCH RATINGS, DEFINITIONS OF 
RATINGS AND OTHER FORMS OF OPINION (2011), available at http://www.fitchratings.com/web_ 
content/ratings/fitch_ratings_definitions_and_scales.pdf.  
 37 See, e.g., Letter from Michel Madelain, Chief Operating Officer, Moody’s 
Investor’s Serv., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 5 (Dec. 14, 2009), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-25-09/s72509-5.pdf (“[R]atings are inherently 
and completely forward-looking, rather than backward-looking, in nature.”).  
 38 Id. at 3. Moody’s compares its ratings to actuarial predictions made by life 
insurance companies:  
[A]n actuary would predict that, in the next five years, a 25 year-old non-
smoker will be less likely to die than an 80 year-old smoker; nonetheless, in 
the next five years, some 25 year-old non-smokers will die, while some 80 
year-old smokers will survive. Similarly, a rating analyst is predicting that a 
Ba1 bond will be more likely to default than a Aaa bond; nonetheless, some 
Aaa bonds will default, while most Ba1 bonds will not default. 
Id. at 4.  
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Moody’s39 S&P40 Fitch41 
Investment Grade 
Aaa AAA AAA 
Aa AA AA 
A A A 
Baa BBB BBB 
Baa3  BBB- BBB- 
Non-Investment Grade 
Ba1 BB+ BB+ 
Ba BB BB 
B B B 
Caa CCC CCC 
Ca CC CC 
C C C 
 D  
 
  
 39 See MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., supra note 36, at 4 (“Moody’s appends 
numerical modifiers 1, 2, and 3 to each generic rating classification from Aa through 
Caa. The modifier 1 indicates that the obligation ranks in the higher end of its generic 
rating category; the modifier 2 indicates a mid-range ranking; and the modifier 3 
indicates a ranking in the lower end of that generic rating category.”).  
 40 See STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 36 (“Ratings from ‘AA’ to ‘CCC’ may be 
modified by the addition of a plus (+) or minus (-) sign to show relative standing within 
the major rating categories.”). 
 41 See FITCH RATINGS, supra note 36 (“The modifiers ‘+’ or ‘-’ may be 
appended to a rating to denote relative status within major rating categories.”).  
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B. How Can a Credit Rating Be Inaccurate When Made? 
Since any retrospective analysis comparing actual 
defaults against before-the-fact predictions will show some level 
of inaccuracy, one must distinguish between those ratings that 
were inaccurate when made as a result of neglect or bad faith 
and those ratings that were made in good faith at the outset but 
only proved inaccurate as a result of naturally occurring market 
forces. The available evidence identifies at least five different 
scenarios when neglect or bad faith in the initial production of 
ratings appears to have contributed to inaccurate ratings.  
The first scenario involves the failure of rating analysts 
to comply with or adhere to available procedures and 
methodologies for producing credit ratings.42 For example, two 
financial economists reported that the CRAs were regularly 
making subjective adjustments in certain cases rather than 
following consistent policies.43 They reported that “‘only 1.3% of 
AAA CDOs closed between January 1997 and March 2007 met 
the rating agency’s reported AAA default standard,’ with the 
rest falling short.”44 They concluded that “the AAA tranches 
should have been rated ‘as approximately BBB’ and that if the 
AAA tranches in their sample of 916 CDOs were so 
downgraded to BBB, the total overvaluation ‘cumulates to 
$86.2 billion in cost to investors.’”45 This example suggests that 
there was a systematic failure to comply with objective 
procedures and methodologies for producing ratings. Many 
other examples have also been alleged where the CRAs failed 
to comply with their own models or failed to implement 
existing models that would have produced more accurate, but 
less issuer-friendly, ratings.46 As recently as September 2011, 
  
 42 See, e.g., John M. Griffin & Dragon Yongjun Tang, Did Subjectivity Play a Role 
in CDO Credit Ratings?, J. FIN. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1364933; see also infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. 
 43 See Coffee, supra note 1, at 242 (“[Credit rating agencies] did not follow a 
consistent policy or valuation model with respect to subordination, but rather regularly 
made ‘adjustments’ on subjective grounds.” (citing Griffin & Tang, supra note 42, at 17)). 
 44 Id. (quoting Griffin & Tang, supra note 42, at 4).  
 45 Id. (quoting Griffin & Tang, supra note 42, at 4-5). 
 46 See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Why Did the Rating Agencies Do Such a Bad Job 
Rating Subprime Securities?, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 585, 593 (2010) (“[R]ather than 
adjusting the ratings, they ‘fixed’ the model so the instruments could continue to ‘be’ 
AAA.”); see also Paul Lasell Bonewitz, Implications of Reputation Economics on 
Regulatory Reform of the Credit Rating Industry, 1 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 391, 394 
(2010) (“[F]or years Standard & Poor’s (S&P) intentionally failed to implement a model 
its executives knew more accurately reflected the risk of structured debt 
products . . . .”). 
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the SEC found that “[o]ne of the larger NRSROs reported that 
it had failed to follow its methodology for rating certain asset-
backed securities” and “[a]ll of the NRSROs failed to follow 
their ratings procedures in some instances.”47 
The second scenario involves the use of identical rating 
symbols to express grossly different risks.48 In spite of years of 
statistical evidence showing that different securities such as 
corporate bonds and CDOs had grossly different default rates 
across the same risk symbols, the CRAs did not seek to alert 
investors to these differences in risk by using different 
symbols. For example, two financial economists reported “that 
the five year cumulative default rate on corporate bonds 
receiving a ‘Baa’ rating from Moody’s between 1983 and 2005 
was only 2.2%, but the same five year cumulative rate between 
1994 and 2005 on CDOs with a Baa rating was 24%—a more 
than ten to one disparity!”49 Similarly, during the financial 
crisis of 2008, “[r]ating agencies gave triple-A ratings to 75% of 
the $3.2 trillion subprime mortgages that lost sizable value 
only months after the ratings were made.”50 Such triple-A 
ratings signaled to investors a degree of safety commensurate 
with U.S. treasury bonds. It is troubling that the CRAs used 
the symbol associated with the benchmark of safe securities to 
represent securities that proved to be, and perhaps should have 
always been known to have been, significantly more risky.  
The third and most often cited scenario involves the 
existence of two inherent conflicts of interests: the issuer-pays 
conflict and the ratings-shopping problem.51 The issuer-pays 
  
 47 See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2011 SUMMARY REPORT OF COMMISSION STAFF’S 
EXAMINATIONS OF EACH NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED STATISTICAL RATING ORGANIZATION 11, 
13 (2011) [hereinafter SEC SEPT. 2011 SUMMARY REPORT], available at 
http://sec.gov/news/studies/2011/2011_nrsro_section15e_examinations_summary_report.pdf.  
 48 See, e.g., Charles Calomiris & Joseph Mason, Reclaim Power from the Ratings 
Agencies, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2007, 3:00 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fac2a61a-
51d9-11dc-8779-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1kay98gwj; see also Jess Cornaggia, Kimberly J. 
Cornaggia & John E. Hund, Credit Ratings Across Asset Classes: A ≡ A? (Mar. 1, 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1909091 (testing whether 
credit ratings contain the same information across asset classes and finding that, relative to 
traditional corporate bonds, “municipal and sovereign bonds receive harsher ratings and 
structured products receive more generous ratings”).   
 49 See Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: The Role of the Credit Rating 
Agencies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th 
Cong. 5 (2008) [hereinafter Senate Turmoil Hearings] (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr.) 
(citing Calomiris & Mason, supra note 48), available at http://banking.senate.gov/ 
public/_files/OpgStmtCoffeeSenateTestimonyTurmoilintheUSCreditMarkets.pdf. 
 50 Lynn Bai, The Performance Disclosures of Credit Rating Agencies: Are They 
Effective Reputational Sanctions?, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 47, 48 (2010). 
 51 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 1, at 234. See generally Deryn Darcy, Note, 
Credit Rating Agencies and the Credit Crisis: How the “Issuer Pays” Conflict 
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conflict describes the business model where the issuer, rather 
than the investor, pays the rating agency for a rating. The 
ratings-shopping problem occurs where issuers shop privately 
for preliminary (as opposed to final) ratings and award 
business to the rating agency willing to give it the highest, 
rather than the most accurate, final rating.52 Ample evidence 
supports the notion that such inherent conflicts of interest put 
unmanaged pressure on the CRAs to inflate ratings in order to 
maintain their market share. For example, e-mails uncovered by 
a Senate committee reveal that one Moody’s managing director 
admitted that its behavior in terms of handing out triple-A 
ratings for mortgage-backed securities made it “either 
incompetent at credit analysis, or like we sold our soul to the devil 
for revenue.”53 An S&P official said that its mortgage team had 
“become so beholden to their top issuers for revenue [that] they 
ha[d] developed a kind of Stockholm syndrome which they 
mistakenly tag as customer value creation.”54 One UBS banker 
warned S&P as follows: “Heard your ratings could be 5 notches 
back of mo[o]dy’s equivalent. This is going to kill your [residential 
business]. It may force us [UBS] to do moodyfitch only cdos [sic].”55  
The fourth scenario involves the failure of the CRAs or 
their proxies to do due diligence.56 Most cogently, Professor 
  
Contributed and What Regulators Might Do About It, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 605; 
156 CONG. REC. S3664, 3673 (daily ed. May 13, 2010) (statement of Sen. Al Franken). 
 52 There is also a related conflict of interest associated with client 
concentration. Issuances of asset-backed securities equaled and then subsequently 
exceeded those of corporate bonds beginning in 2002 and “the top six underwriters [of 
asset-backed securities] controlled over 50 percent of the mortgage-backed securities 
underwriting market in 2007, and the top eleven underwriters each had more than 5 
percent of the market and in total controlled roughly 80 percent of this very lucrative 
market”; thus it becomes clear that a rating agency’s market share could be 
significantly diminished if a small concentration of clients became unhappy and sought 
to take business elsewhere. See Enhancing Investor Protection and the Regulation of 
Securities Markets: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs, 111th Cong. 55-56 (2009) [hereinafter Enhancing Investor Protection] (written 
statement of John C. Coffee, Jr.). By contrast, for corporate bonds, whose ratings have 
proven far more accurate, “no one client accounted for more than 1% of their business.” 
See Coffee, supra note 1, at 237.  
 53 Gillian Tett, E-mails Throw Light on Murky World of Credit, FIN. TIMES 
(Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a9da1aa4-508b-11df-bc86-00144feab49a.html# 
axzz1RSKtZTp5.  
 54 Id.  
 55 See 156 CONG. REC. S3664, 3681 (daily ed. May 13, 2010) (statement of 
Sen. Carl Levin). 
 56 See, e.g., John Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the “Worldwide 
Credit Crisis”: The Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for 
Improvement, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 109, 170-71 (“Fitch explains that it ‘does not 
audit or verify . . . or . . . perform any other kind of investigative diligence into the 
accuracy . . . or completeness’ of the information it receives.” (citation omitted)); Darcy, 
supra note 51, at 617 (“CRAs do not perform their own due diligence.”); Paul 
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Coffee pointed out that CRAs were alone among financial 
gatekeepers in that they did not conduct “factual verification 
with respect to the information on which their valuation 
models rely.”57 He explains that the problem is “that no 
valuation model, however well designed, can outperform its 
informational inputs; hence, use of unverified data results in 
the well-known ‘GIGO Effect’—Garbage In, Garbage Out.”58 
While the CRAs used to rely on due diligence firms to test the 
creditworthiness of securitized mortgages, this practice mostly 
ended after the year 2000 with the CRAs’ tacit approval.59  
The fifth scenario involves “less-than-thorough business 
practices.”60 According to the SEC, “[w]hen the firms didn’t have 
enough staff to do the job right, they often cut corners.”61 A senior 
analytical manager at one of the Big Three stated in an e-mail 
that “[w]e do not have the resources to support what we are doing 
now.”62 As the CRAs began expanding their coverage of issuances 
and began taking on more complex instruments, resources to 
produce each rating with integrity declined.63 At present, there is 
a large disparity in staffing resources when comparing the Big 
Three against the smaller seven NRSROs. While the Big Three 
each employ over one thousand credit analysts and supervisors, 
the smaller seven each employ considerably fewer.64  
  
Justensen, Note, Ratings Recall: Will New Reform Proposals Make Lasting Impact?, 35 
J. CORP. L. 193, 201 (2009) (“In 2008, critics again blamed CRAs for substandard due 
diligence, particularly with respect to the failing mortgage-backed securities that 
prompted the worldwide credit crisis.”).  
 57 See Coffee, supra note 1, at 244. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 241 (“[F]actual verification of the creditworthiness of securitized 
mortgages largely disappeared after 2000, as investment banks and deal arrangers 
ceased to pay for such activities, and the CRAs did not insist on their continuation.”).  
 60 See Hill, supra note 46, at 594 (citing OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS 
& EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED 
IN THE COMMISSION STAFF’S EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT CREDIT RATINGS AGENCIES 2 
(2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexamination070808.pdf). 
 61 Id. at 595 (citation omitted). 
 62 See FRANK PARTNOY, RETHINKING REGULATION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES: 
AN INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS PERSPECTIVE 5 (2009), available at http://www.cii.org/ 
UserFiles/file/CRAWhitePaper04-14-09.pdf. 
 63 See id. (“Rating agencies also began rating substantially greater numbers 
of issuers and increasingly complex instruments. But the resources expended per 
rating declined. As they expanded ratings to cover large numbers of structured finance 
products, including tranches of various collateralized debt obligations, some NRSROs 
neglected to divert resources to update rating models and methodologies or recruit 
additional staff needed to ensure quality.”). 
 64 A.M. Best (120), DBRS (95), R&I (78), JCR (57), Morningstar (24), Kroll 
(13), and Egan-Jones (5). See SEC SEPT. 2011 SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 47, at 8. 
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C. The Debate over the Rating-Agency Question 
Billions, and sometimes trillions, of dollars have been 
alleged to have been lost during the financial crisis of 2008.65 
Congress’s account holds that inaccurate credit ratings misled 
investors with respect to the level of risk they were assuming.66 
Other accounts hold that sophisticated investors over-relied on 
credit ratings and share equal blame for making the same 
mistakes as the CRAs.67 Substantially all agree, however, that 
inaccurate and unreliable credit ratings on structured finance 
products68 were a root cause of the financial crisis of 2008.69 
  
 65 See 156 CONG. REC. S3664, 3673 (daily ed. May 13, 2010) (statement of 
Sen. Al Franken) (“This conflict of interest has cost American investors and pensioners 
billions of dollars because supposedly risk-free investments have failed or been 
downgraded to junk status.”); see id. at S3675 (statement of Sen. George Lemieux) (“We 
have a chance to address the issue of the rating agencies, because, but for their failure 
to do their job, we may not have had this debacle that destroyed, as some estimate, 
$600 trillion worth of wealth.”). 
 66 Congress found that,  
[i]n the recent financial crisis, the ratings on structured financial products 
have proven to be inaccurate. This inaccuracy contributed significantly to the 
mismanagement of risks by financial institutions and investors, which in 
turn adversely impacted the health of the economy in the United States and 
around the world. Such inaccuracy necessitates increased accountability on 
the part of the credit rating agencies.  
See Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 931(5), 124 Stat. 1376, 1872 (2010).  
 67 See Hill, supra note 46, at 598 (explaining that both market participants and 
rating agencies “drank the Kool-Aid”); see Frank Partnoy, Overdependence on Credit 
Ratings Was a Primary Cause of the Crisis 9 (San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 09-015, 
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1430653 (“Without overreliance on ratings, 
investors would more likely have looked through the complexity of CDO and SIV 
transactions to the underlying mortgage-backed securities, and prices would have more 
accurately reflected market estimates of default probability, recovery, and correlation.”). 
 68 This phenomenon was limited to asset-backed securities (i.e., structured 
finance products) and not other types of debt securities. See, e.g., Hunt, supra note 56, 
at 170-71 (“Official reports on the crisis did not indicate that agencies did a poor job in 
the corporate segment. Indeed, regulatory authorities’ studies drew a fundamental 
distinction between agencies’ traditional and structured-finance ratings and criticized 
only the latter.”); Coffee, supra note 1, at 236 (“The failure of the CRAs was largely 
limited to structured financial products. Similar problems have not characterized the 
ratings of corporate bonds.”).  
 69 See PARTNOY, supra note 62, at 13 (“[I]naccurate and unreasonable credit 
ratings from NRSROs were a primary cause of the recent crisis. . . .”); see also Coffee, 
supra note 1, at 232 (“Few disinterested observers doubt that inflated credit ratings 
and conflict-ridden rating processes played a significant role in exacerbating the 2008 
financial crisis.”); 156 CONG. REC. S3965, 3977 (daily ed. May 19, 2010) (statement of 
Sen. Christopher Dodd) (“I agree with my colleagues that erroneous credit ratings on 
asset backed securities played a central role in the financial crisis and that we need to 
improve the regulation of credit ratings.”).  
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The critics generally divide into two camps: the Free 
Market Camp and the Reform Camp.70 A fundamental 
difference between the two camps concerns their views over the 
informational value of ratings, which influences how the camps 
might ask and answer the rating-agency question.  
The Free Market Camp believes that ratings have little 
informational value and that better indicators of risk are 
generally provided by market measures such as credit spreads 
and credit-default-swap spreads.71 One study found that credit-
default-swap spreads incorporate new risk information more 
quickly than credit ratings.72 While they acknowledge that 
investors frequently rely on ratings to assess the riskiness of 
their investments, they argue that this type of reliance is 
misplaced. For these reasons, the Free Market Camp would 
ask, do assessments of credit risk exist that are more accurate 
and reliable than credit ratings?  
The Reform Camp, on the other hand, believes that 
ratings still provide valuable information about risk and that 
such market measures do not provide a superior substitute, 
especially in the case of complicated and obscure structured 
finance products. They believe that CRAs are in a better 
position than any other market actors to assess risk and that, 
while blind reliance on ratings should be discouraged, 
measured reliance is justified from an efficiency standpoint as 
long as regulatory measures ensure that the incentives to 
produce accurate and reliable ratings are properly aligned with 
the CRAs’ interests. For these reasons, the Reform Camp 
would ask, how can CRAs, including those who are NRSROs, 
  
 70 See Coffee, supra note 1, at 231 (“[R]eformers divide into two basic camps: 
(1) those who see the ‘issuer pays’ model of the major credit ratings firms as the 
fundamental cause of inflated ratings, and (2) those who view the licensing power 
given to credit ratings agencies by regulatory rules requiring an investment grade 
rating from an NRSRO rating agency as creating a de facto monopoly that precludes 
competition.”). 
 71 A credit spread for a bond is the difference between a bond’s yield and the 
yield of a comparable risk-free bond. Higher yields (and therefore wider credit spreads) 
reflect the market’s view of the relative riskiness of such bond. Credit default swaps 
are effectively insurance policies that investors can buy to protect themselves against 
an entity’s default. Credit-default-swap spreads are equal to the premium on such 
protection. For higher credit risks, the premium would be higher (and therefore the 
spread would be wider) and vice versa. See Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of 
Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 619, 624 (1999) [hereinafter Siskel & Ebert] (credit spreads); see also Mark J. 
Flannery, Joel F. Houston & Frank Partnoy, Credit Default Swap Spreads as Viable 
Substitutes for Credit Ratings, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2085, 2088 (2009) [hereinafter Credit 
Default Swap Spreads] (credit-default-swap spreads).  
 72 See generally Credit Default Swap Spreads, supra note 71.  
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be encouraged through regulation to produce more accurate 
and reliable credit ratings?  
Professor Partnoy, the leading advocate for the Free 
Market Camp, historically favored replacing references to 
NRSRO credit ratings in statutes and regulations with market-
based measures such as credit spreads73 or credit-default-swap 
spreads.74 To ease concerns about volatility, he suggested using 
thirty-to-ninety day rolling averages of such spreads.75 He has 
recently advocated, in light of SEC proposals, that a 
professional judgment analysis taking into account multiple 
factors including such market measures and credit ratings 
could also be a viable substitute for sole reliance on NRSRO 
credit ratings.76 He has long argued that references to NRSRO 
credit ratings in statutes and regulations transformed the 
NRSROs from providers of risk information to sellers of 
“regulatory licenses.”77 Regulatory licenses are “the valuable 
property rights associated with the ability of a private entity 
[such as an NRSRO], rather than the regulator, to determine the 
substantive effect of legal rules.”78 Since NRSROs were given this 
quasi-governmental power in a wide variety of contexts, they 
were effectively guaranteed continued business even if they 
performed poorly.79 This partially explains the phenomenon of 
widespread inaccurate credit ratings during the recent financial 
crisis and previous crises. If statutes and regulations were to 
require a different proxy for risk than NRSRO credit ratings, 
this would remove the power of the NRSROs to grant regulatory 
  
 73 See Siskel & Ebert, supra note 71, at 704 (recommending credit spreads in 
place of credit ratings).  
 74 See generally Credit Default Swap Spreads, supra note 71.  
 75 See PARTNOY, supra note 62, at 17 (“Investors concerned about the 
volatility of market prices could use 30-day or 90-day rolling averages.”). In addition, to 
ease concerns that market-based credit spreads would only be available after a market 
for the bond has arisen, he has suggested “pre-issuance estimates of credit spreads (i.e., 
‘price talk’), in much the same way investors now rely on pre-issuance estimates of 
credit ratings, which are not issued until the bonds are issued (credit spreads are 
available at the same time).” See Siskel & Ebert, supra note 71, at 706 n.391.  
 76 See, e.g., Partnoy, supra note 67, at 16 (advocating professional judgment 
analysis to replace sole reliance on credit ratings that would include market measures, 
such as credit spreads and swap spreads, as one factor of the analysis). 
 77 See PARTNOY, supra note 62, at 2. See generally Siskel & Ebert, supra note 
71. For further discussion of the NRSRO’s “power to license” over time see infra Parts 
II.A.2, II.B.2, and II.C.2.  
 78 Siskel & Ebert, supra note 71, at 623.  
 79 See PARTNOY, supra note 62, at 2 (“A regulatory license is a key that 
unlocks the financial markets. Credit rating agencies profit from providing ratings that 
unlock access to the markets, regardless of the accuracy of their ratings.”). Professor 
Partnoy also criticizes, and makes suggestions to remedy, the lack of accountability of 
the credit rating agencies and the lack of competition. See id. at 14-18. 
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licenses and might cause the NRSROs to once again depend only 
on their reputations to maintain business.80  
Professor Coffee, the leading advocate for the Reform 
Camp, disputes this view. He argues that credit ratings cannot 
simply be replaced by credit spreads or other market measures, 
and it is unrealistic to expect even sophisticated institutional 
investors to do their own credit analysis in the context of 
complex and opaque debt instruments such as CDOs.81 He 
compares such “‘do-it-yourself’ financial analysis” to “‘do-it-
yourself’ brain surgery.”82 Under this view, NRSRO-dependent 
regulatory licenses may actually improve the quality of ratings 
to the extent they prevent investors from relying on un-
established (“fly-by-night”) CRAs instead of those with an 
established track record. Regulatory licenses are viewed as 
much less problematic since they do not alone explain the 
dominance of the Big Three NRSROs. Such NRSROs were 
dominant before NRSRO status was introduced in the 1970s and 
have remained dominant since the expansion of the NRSRO club 
from three to ten rating agencies.83 Professor Coffee argues that 
the issuer-pays conflict of interest, rather than the relaxation of 
high standards from the exploitation of regulatory licenses, is 
the main impediment to accurate ratings.84 He also touches upon 
the independent ratings-shopping problem that some accounts 
treat as equally problematic.85 Professor Coffee argues that the 
solution to the issuer-pays conflict must “either (1) divorce issuer 
payment of the CRA from issuer selection of the CRA, or (2) 
encourage (and implicitly subsidize) an alternative ‘subscriber 
pays’ market for ratings.”86 Any solution adopted must realign 
the incentives of the CRAs so that they are rewarded for 
accuracy instead of issuer-friendly ratings: “if the incentives 
  
 80 See Siskel & Ebert, supra note 71, at 682 (“The regulatory license view is 
quite simple. Absent regulation incorporating ratings, the regulatory license view 
agrees with the reputational capital view: rating agencies sell information and survive 
based on their ability to accumulate and retain reputational capital.”). 
 81 See Coffee, supra note 1, at 233.  
 82 Id.  
 83 See id. at 248. (“If licensing power alone could explain the dominance of the 
Big Three, then the newer members of the SEC’s NRSRO club should be sharing in a 
collective oligopoly.”).  
 84 Id. at 232-34.  
 85 Id. at 255; see also, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. S3955, 3956 (daily ed. May 19, 
2010) (statement of Sen. Al Franken) (“Right now, credit rating agencies have 
incentives to hand out top AAA ratings to every product because they need to maintain 
their business. If they hand out low ratings, issuers of financial products can go shop 
around for a higher rating from a different rating agency.”).  
 86 Coffee, supra note 1, at 234.  
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remain poorly aligned, regulatory oversight alone is unlikely to 
ensure ratings accuracy.”87  
D. Congress’s Solution 
While the debate over the rating-agency question has 
been ongoing for over a decade, reform has often “seemed stuck 
in an ever-repeating cycle of futility.”88 This came to an end in 
2006 when Congress adopted the first leg of Ratings Reform, 
known as CRARA. While CRARA contained certain free 
market aspects such the NRSROs’ voluntary withdrawal 
right,89 it did not heed the advice of the Free Market Camp to 
rollback regulatory licenses. The clear purpose of CRARA was 
to “improve ratings quality.”90 It sought to do so through a 
narrowly tailored regulatory regime.  
Unfortunately, much of the damage that CRARA sought 
to prevent had already been done by the time it became 
effective on June 26, 2007, and new problems were observed in 
the financial crisis of 2008.91 As a result, Congress passed the 
second leg of Ratings Reform in July 2010 as part of the Dodd-
Frank Act. While Dodd-Frank builds on CRARA’s Reform 
Camp architecture, it is a clearer compromise than CRARA 
between the views of the two camps. It seeks to achieve the 
Free Market Camp’s goal of decreasing reliance on ratings, 
while at the same time pursuing measures to encourage 
ratings to be more accurate and reliable.92 It seeks to do the 
former by eliminating substantially all NRSRO regulatory 
licenses on the federal level and replacing them with new 
standards of creditworthiness by July 2012.93 It seeks to achieve 
the latter through a multifaceted approach of heightened 
regulation, accountability, and transparency.94 The crown jewel 
of the Reform Camp approach, which has not yet been (and 
  
 87 Id. at 278.  
 88 Hill, supra note 17, at 133.  
 89 See supra notes 8, 33.  
 90 See CRARA, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327 (2006) (“An Act to improve 
ratings quality for the protection of investors and in the public interest by fostering 
accountability, transparency, and competition in the credit rating agency industry.”).  
 91 See supra note 66.  
 92 See Hill, supra note 17, at 143 (“The reform has two important goals. One is 
to decrease reliance on ratings . . . . The other goal is to improve the quality of ratings.”).  
 93 See Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 939-939A, 124 Stat. 1376, 1885-87 
(2010).  
 94 See id. §§ 932-938. 
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may not be) adopted, is known as the Franken Proposal.95 It is 
intended to address the issuer-pays conflict and the ratings-
shopping problem by creating a centralized board (the CRA 
Board) controlled by investors to assign NRSROs to issuers 
with respect to initial, but not secondary, ratings in order to 
divorce issuer selection from issuer payment. The CRA Board 
also would serve as a “rater” of at least some subset of the 
NRSROs and would increase or decrease rating assignments 
based on past performance. The SEC must adopt the Franken 
Proposal or one of its alternatives after delivering its findings 
and recommendations to Congress no later than July 2012.96  
II. WHY BE AN NRSRO? 
This part examines the question of why a CRA would 
want to be an NRSRO. It describes the benefits and burdens of 
being an NRSRO prior to 2006 and in the aftermath of CRARA 
and Dodd-Frank. It shows that being an NRSRO has become 
significantly less attractive over time.  
A. Pre-2006 
Before 2006, the CRAs placed a high value on NRSRO 
status primarily because it afforded financial and reputational 
benefits without any significant burdens. It conferred—among 
other advantages—minimal competition because the club had 
few members, captive business because of regulatory licenses, 
and a shield against negligence exposure. These, in turn, 
brought increased visibility and sent a signal to market that 
NRSRO ratings had the government’s seal of approval as 
proxies for safety and quality. Investment adviser regulation 
under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the Advisers Act),97 
which also conferred some reputational benefits, was the only 
burden of NRSRO status, and it was minimal.  
  
 95 See Solicitation of Comment to Assist in Study on Assigned Credit Ratings, 
Exchange Act Release No. 64,456, at 49 (May 10, 2011) [hereinafter Solicitation of 
Comment], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2011/34-64456.pdf (includes a 
copy of the Franken Proposal’s proposed provisions in Section 15E(w) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 as an appendix [hereinafter the Franken Proposal], as those 
provisions would have been added by Section 939D of H.R. 4173 (111th Congress), as 
passed by the Senate on May 20, 2010). 
 96 See Dodd-Frank § 939F(d).  
 97 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-6 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-71 (excluding P.L. 
112-55 and 112-56)).  
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1. The Exclusive Club  
From the early 1900s, when the credit rating business 
first took shape, through 1975, when NRSRO status was first 
introduced by the SEC, the Big Three (or their predecessors) 
were the primary issuers of credit ratings on debt securities.98 
In 1975, the SEC recognized the Big Three as the original 
NRSROs.99 While four additional CRAs were later admitted, 
each of them was subsequently merged with or acquired by the 
Big Three100 such that the club only comprised its original three 
members as of January 2003.101  
While two additional CRAs joined the club by March 
2005,102 the recognition of new NRSROs was tightly controlled 
by the SEC.103 “The single most important factor in the SEC 
staff’s assessment . . . [was] whether the rating agency [was] 
‘nationally recognized’ in the United States as an issuer of 
credible and reliable ratings by the predominant users of 
securities ratings.”104 As a result, new entrants faced a chicken-
and-egg dilemma in becoming NRSROs: “it [was] nearly 
impossible to obtain clients [without] a track record for reliable 
ratings, yet such a track record [was] difficult to generate 
unless one first ha[d] clients.”105 
While the SEC’s approach created a high barrier to entry 
for those outside of the club, it made membership in the club more 
valuable through exclusivity since fewer members meant less 
competition. This was especially valuable in light of a market 
norm by which issuers regularly sought two and sometimes three 
ratings on an issuance of debt.106 By one estimate, Moody’s and 
  
 98 See SEC REPORT OF 2003, supra note 9, at 5. For a history of the NRSROs 
during the twentieth century, see generally Siskel & Ebert, supra note 71.  
 99 See SEC REPORT OF 2003, supra note 9, at 8-9. 
 100 These firms were (1) Duff and Phelps, Inc.; (2) McCarthy Crisanti & 
Maffei, Inc.; (3) IBCA Limited and its subsidiary, IBCA, Inc.; and (4) Thomson 
BankWatch, Inc. Id. at 9. 
 101 Id. at 5. 
 102 See Dominion Bond Rating Service, Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL 
402819 (Feb. 24, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mr-noaction/ 
dominionbond022403-out.pdf; A.M. Best Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 711823 
(Mar. 3, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mr-noaction/ 
am030305.htm.  
 103 See SEC REPORT OF 2003, supra note 9, at 9-10. 
 104 Id. at 9.  
 105 Coffee, supra note 1, at 234. 
 106 See Hill, supra note 46, at 590. 
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S&P held “nearly 80 percent of the market”107 in 2006. Fitch 
presumably held most of the balance.108 Many criticized this lack 
of competition as lowering the quality of ratings.109  
2. The Power to License 
To distinguish safe securities from risky securities, the 
SEC needed a measure of safety and quality. The NRSRO 
concept was developed specifically for this purpose in 1975.110 In 
the context of broker-dealer net capital requirements,111 the 
SEC sought to encourage broker-dealers to hold “investment 
grade” securities rather than “non-investment grade” securities 
by permitting broker-dealers to subtract from their net worth a 
smaller percentage (known as a haircut) for investment grade 
securities.112 This allowed such broker-dealers the benefit of 
disclosing a higher net capital figure. Since the NRSROs were 
given the regulatory authority to determine the meaning of the 
term “investment grade,” they were empowered to determine 
the substantive effect of these rules—in the parlance of 
Professor Partnoy, they were given the power to grant 
“regulatory licenses.”113 As a result, market actors, such as 
broker-dealers, became dependent upon NRSRO ratings in 
making investment decisions. 
After 1975, NRSRO credit ratings became widely 
incorporated as proxies for safety and quality “in federal and state 
legislation, rules issued by financial and other regulators, foreign 
regulatory schemes, and private financial contracts.”114 For 
example, they came to influence the holdings of money market 
  
 107 152 CONG. REC. E1957, 1957 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006) (statement of Brian 
Carroll submitted by Rep. Fitzpatrick) (“[O]nly three NRSROs have staff No Action letters: 
Moody’s, S&P and Fitch Inc., with the first two capturing nearly 80 percent of the market.”). 
 108 Id.  
 109 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. H5255, 5255 (daily ed. June 28, 2005) (statement 
of Rep. Fitzpatrick) (“Two firms dominate the ratings market with SEC approval and 
this, Mr. Speaker, creates an uncompetitive marketplace, stifles competition from other 
rating agencies, lowers the quality of ratings and allows conflicts of interest to go 
unchecked. It is bad for the market and it is hurtful to individual investors.”). 
 110 See SEC REPORT OF 2003, supra note 9, at 5 (“Since 1975, the Commission has 
relied on ratings by market-recognized credible rating agencies for distinguishing among 
grades of creditworthiness in various regulations under the federal securities laws.”).  
 111 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2011).  
 112 See Removal of Certain References to Credit Ratings, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-64,352, 76 Fed. Reg. 26,550, 26,552-53 (Apr. 27, 2011) [hereinafter SEC 
April 2011 Release]. 
 113 See Siskel & Ebert, supra note 71, at 623.  
 114 See SEC REPORT OF 2003, supra note 9, at 6. 
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funds,115 banks116 and insurance companies.117 They also allowed 
issuers of registered securities not widely followed by the market 
to use short-form registration statements instead of long forms.118  
NRSRO-dependent laws and regulations created an 
artificial demand in the market to obtain NRSRO credit 
ratings, which meant guaranteed business for the NRSROs. 
Commentators criticized this “regulatory licensing” power since 
such guaranteed business did not reward accuracy, but only 
membership in the NRSRO club: they were “insulated from the 
standard market penalty for being wrong—the loss of 
business.”119 As an illustrative example of the financial benefits 
of such membership, as of December 31, 2006, Moody’s 
reported net income of approximately $754 million120 and, 
during that December, its market capitalization nearly peaked 
at $19.32 billion.121 
3. The Negligence Shield  
In 1981, the SEC reversed a long-standing policy 
prohibiting the disclosure of credit ratings in registration 
statements because it believed such ratings would help 
investors make informed investment decisions about the level 
of risk they would assume.122 Such disclosure, however, would 
have made the NRSROs “experts” under the Securities Act of 
1933, which would subject their ratings to negligence exposure 
under Section 11. Since this would have imposed a higher 
liability standard on the NRSROs in the context of the sale of 
  
 115 See Investment Company Act Rule 2a-7, 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2010). 
 116 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831e(d)(4)(A) (West 2010).  
 117 See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 1192.10 (2010).  
 118 See, e.g., Form S-3, 17 C.F.R. § 239.13 (2010).  
 119 See Calomiris & Mason, supra 48; see also Frank Partnoy, How and Why 
Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers, in FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: 
CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS? 59, 60-61 (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=900257 (In a minimally competitive 
environment, such regulatory licenses may therefore be responsible for “generat[ing] 
economic rents for NRSROs that persist even when they perform poorly and otherwise 
would lose reputational capital.”).  
 120 See Moody’s Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 27 (Feb. 25, 2011) 
[hereinafter Moody’s 2010 Annual Report], available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/ 
edgar/data/1059556/000119312511047974/d10k.htm#tx1118549_23.  
 121 See Moody’s Corporation Historical Market Cap Data, YCHARTS, 
http://ycharts.com/companies/MCO/historical_data/market_cap?start_month=1&start_
day=29&start_year=2005&end_month=1&end_day=29&end_year=2012 (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2012). Moody’s market capitalization reached a peak of $20.81 billion on 
March 31, 2006. See id.  
 122 Disclosure of Security Ratings in Registration Statements, Securities Act 
Release No. 6336, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,024 (Aug. 18, 1981) [hereinafter 1981 Release]. 
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registered debt securities than it would have in any other 
context,123 the NRSROs informed the SEC that they would not 
consent to such disclosure.124  
Since the SEC was comfortable that the antifraud 
rules125 would be sufficient to hold the NRSROs accountable for 
reckless behavior,126 it created a shield to protect NRSRO credit 
ratings disclosed in registration statements from negligence 
exposure in order to encourage disclosure of such ratings. Non-
NRSROs, by contrast, would not benefit from such a shield and 
would therefore need to consent to negligence exposure for 
ratings disclosed in a registration statement. This gave the 
NRSROs a considerable competitive advantage over all other 
CRAs. Commentators cited this benefit as evidence that the 
NRSROs were held to a lower standard than other comparable 
gatekeepers such as lawyers, auditors, and even other CRAs.127 
4. The Seal of Approval 
Because the SEC only allowed a small group of 
“nationally recognized” CRAs into the club and only gave such 
CRAs the power to license and a negligence shield, it increased 
the visibility of these CRAs and sent a signal to the market 
  
 123 CRAs generally have First Amendment protection from common law 
negligence claims because credit ratings are thought to constitute a form of speech that 
is of public concern and therefore entitled to the highest form of protection. See, e.g., 
Approaches to Improving Credit Rating Agency Regulation: Hearing Before the H. 
Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Gov’t, 111th Cong. 1-2 (2009) (statement 
of Eugene Volokh, Gary T. Schwartz Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law), available 
at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/volokh.pdf. Under this 
standard, rating agency speech is protected unless a rating is made with actual malice, 
meaning “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was 
false or not.” See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). Some have 
indicated that the actual malice standard equates to the scienter element of a Rule 
10b-5 claim, but that a state of mind of negligence is not enough. See, e.g., Letter from 
Laurence H. Tribe & Thomas C. Goldstein, Legal Consultants to Moody’s Investors 
Serv., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 14, 2009), available at 
www.sec.gov/comments/s7-24-09/s72409-13.pdf.  
 124 See 1981 Release, supra note 122, at 42,027 n.27.  
 125 See id. at 42,025 & n.1. (“[T]he rating organization would continue to be 
subject to liability under the antifraud provisions of the Federal securities laws. . . . See, 
e.g., Section 17(a) of the Securities Act (15 U.S.C. 77q(a)); Section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78j(b)) and Rule 10b-5 thereunder (17 CFR 240.10b-5); 
and Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-6).”).  
 126 See PARTNOY, supra note 62, at 14 (“Rating agencies have been sued 
relatively infrequently, and rarely have been held liable.”).  
 127 See, e.g., Partnoy, supra note 119, at 83-84 (“The unique problems 
associated with [NRSROs] as gatekeepers stem from . . . their lack of exposure to civil 
and criminal liability. Unlike other gatekeepers, [NRSROs] are explicitly immune to 
prosecution for certain violations of securities law, including section 11 of the 
Securities Act of 1933 . . . .”). 
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that their ratings could be relied upon as proxies for safety and 
quality in consonance with their regulatory functions. Some 
interpreted this signal as conferring governmental approval on 
the quality of debt securities, much like a USDA Grade A seal 
would signify the quality of meat products to consumers.128 Non-
NRSROs, in particular, argued that the “lack of NRSRO status 
substantially hindered their businesses’ rate of growth 
[since] . . . the marketplace views the NRSRO designation as 
the equivalent of the ‘Good Housekeeping Seal Of Approval.’”129  
By this account, the government would be responsible 
for the brand name status of the Big Three. By other accounts, 
however, NRSRO status itself would not be responsible for 
such reputational benefits because the Big Three dominated 
the industry long before NRSRO status came into being. These 
accounts would attribute the stature of the Big Three to the 
“reputational capital”130 they acquired over time after being first 
movers in the industry.131  
In the absence of informative disclosure, moreover, the 
SEC had no meaningful mechanism during this period to 
actually test the accuracy and reliability of the NRSROs’ 
output. So the reputations of the NRSROs were not based on 
objective performance measures but merely on industry 
perceptions. The SEC noted in 2003 that “[w]ithout such an 
assurance as to the quality of the ratings issued by a rating 
agency, it would be foolhardy to rely upon ratings as a proxy for 
credit quality in regulation.”132 Yet, national recognition—and 
not accurate performance—was the primary qualifying 
attribute for attaining NRSRO status, and investors relied 
accordingly on NRSRO ratings as a shorthand for risk. Those 
outside of the club were excluded from this benefit. 
  
 128 See Siskel & Ebert, supra note 71, at 684-86.  
 129 SEC REPORT OF 2003, supra note 9, at 38. 
 130 Reputational capital is a metaphor for the value that a company’s 
reputation has in generating future business. Since a CRA’s reputation and ability to 
maintain future business are on the line each time it issues a rating, the CRA is said to 
be pledging its reputational capital to generate the confidence of investors. See 
generally JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE (2006) (stating the reputational capital view and recognizing its limits). 
 131 See Coffee, supra note 1, at 263 (“Their supremacy thus seems more based on 
‘first mover’ advantages and the difficulty of entering the field without a proven track 
record. If, as widely assumed, economies of scale characterize the production of financial 
information, the first entrant can operate more efficiently and exclude later entrants.”).  
 132 SEC REPORT OF 2003, supra note 9, at 38. 
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5. Investment Adviser Regulation 
Investment adviser regulation under the Advisers Act 
imposed the sole burden on NRSRO status during the pre-2006 
period. Its duties, not narrowly tailored to NRSROs, included 
filing Form ADV,133 recordkeeping requirements, and periodic 
examinations.134 While the NRSROs were purportedly subject to 
the same duties as all other investment advisers, they viewed 
their registrations as voluntary135 and thought that certain 
requirements such as the recordkeeping rules did not apply to 
them.136 The SEC generally acquiesced to this view.137 This in 
turn hampered the SEC’s ability to perform meaningful 
examinations and led the agency to characterize the NRSROs 
as not subject to much “formal regulation or oversight.”138 
Advisers Act regulation, however, did confer one benefit: it sent 
a message to the market that NRSROs were regulated entities 
whether or not the SEC was really watching them.139 
  
 133 Form ADV required NRSROs to disclose, among other things, information 
about its advisory business and other business activities, financial industry affiliations, 
participations or interests in client transactions, disciplinary history, owners and executive 
officers, and the locations of books and records. It did not require any disclosures specifically 
tailored to NRSROs such as the disclosure of procedures and methodologies, performance 
data, rating action histories, or a description of the data relied on when forming ratings 
opinions. See, e.g., Moody’s Inv. Servs., Form ADV (Feb. 2005), available at 
http://www.adviserinfo.sec.gov/%28S%282ztk5wovxx43l2wyi11rpdaf%29%29/iapd/content/ 
viewform/adv022005/sections/iapd_AdvIdentifyingInfoSection.aspx?ORG_PK=111146&RGL
TR_PK=&STATE_CD=&FLNG_PK=0588E7BC000801480305C5F0024CBAAD056C8CC0. 
 134 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION, 2009 WL 86761, 
§ 21.1 at 1 (2009).  
 135 See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 208, 211 (1985). The Lowe majority held 
that a publisher of nonpersonalized investment advice that was circulated broadly to 
the public fell into an exclusion from the defined term “investment adviser.” The reason 
was that the “publications [did] not fit within the central purpose of the Act because 
they [did] not offer individualized advice attuned to any specific portfolio or to any 
client’s particular needs.” Id. 
 136 See SEC REPORT OF 2003, supra note 9, at 20 (“[T]he effectiveness of the 
Commission’s examination being hampered by, among other things, the lack of 
recordkeeping requirements tailored to NRSRO activities, the NRSROs’ assertions that the 
document retention and production requirements of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 
are inapplicable to the credit rating business, and their claims that the First Amendment 
shields the NRSROs from producing certain documents to the Commission.”). 
 137 Memorandum from Ann Nazareth, Dir., Sec. Exch. Comm’n Div. of Mkt. 
Regulation, to William Donaldson, Chairman, Sec. Exch. Comm’n 5 (June 3, 2003), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/ratingagency/baker060403.pdf. 
 138 See SEC REPORT OF 2003, supra note 9, at 4. 
 139 See HAZEN, supra note 134 (describing phenomenon in 1985 that entities 
such as the NRSROs could have deregistered as investment advisers after the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Lowe: “Presumably, these publishers believed it would add to their 
credibility to be able to state that they were registered with the SEC.”). 
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B. Post-CRARA (2006–2010) 
After the passage of CRARA in 2006, the ratio of benefits 
to burdens with respect to the NRSROs began to shift. Between 
2006 and 2010, the NRSRO club doubled in size, the NRSROs’ 
power to license began to marginally diminish, and the SEC 
considered repealing—but ultimately did not repeal—the 
NRSROs’ negligence shield. Congress and the SEC also took 
measures to negate the perception that such credit ratings had 
the government’s seal of approval. While these measures did 
little to alter the financial and reputational benefits of NRSRO 
status (especially for the Big Three), the introduction of NRSRO 
regulation, which conferred some reputational benefits, added 
significant new legal burdens to all of the NRSROs. 
1. The Expanding Club  
In light of critiques regarding the exclusive nature of 
the NRSRO club, Congress sought to make entry easier 
through objective standards that relied more on the judgment 
of investors than on the judgment of the SEC.140 As a proxy for 
such investors, Congress required certifications from at least 
ten nonaffiliated qualified institutional buyers that used such 
ratings for at least three years.141 Nonetheless, no mechanism 
was put into place to actually test the accuracy and reliability 
of the NRSROs’ output. By December 2007, the NRSRO club 
doubled to ten.142  
In addition, Congress adopted other measures to foster 
competition. For example, it adopted new performance 
disclosure requirements to permit the market to compare the 
performance of different NRSROs143 and an Equal Access Rule 
to give lesser established NRSROs an equal opportunity to rate 
structured finance products by requiring issuers to provide the 
  
 140 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(62), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(62) (2006).  
 141 See id. § 15E(a)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(a)(C). 
 142 See Commission Orders Granting NRSRO Registration, U.S. SEC. EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/ratingagency.htm (last visited June 
20, 2011). The new members were R&I, JCR, Kroll (the successor to LACE Financial Corp.), 
Morningstar (the successor to Realpoint LLC) and Egan-Jones. As of August 10, 2011, no 
additional credit rating agencies have been admitted to the club. Jeannette Neumann, Call 
to Downsize Giants of Ratings, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 10, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424053111904480904576498493884494956.html?mod=ITP_moneyandinvesting_0
#articleTabs%3Darticle.  
 143 See Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-59,342 (Feb. 2, 2009). 
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same information to hired and non-hired NRSROs.144 Since the 
Equal Access Rule is NRSRO-specific, it represents a new 
benefit of NRSRO status.145  
Nonetheless, as of year-end 2010, there had not yet been 
any tangible impact on competition: the Big Three still issued 
approximately 97 percent of all outstanding ratings across all 
categories reported,146 and in the structured finance product 
realm, they issued approximately 94 percent of all outstanding 
ratings.147 Some studies, moreover, suggested that greater 
competition was inadvertently producing a race to the bottom,148 
possibly as a result of the issuer-pays conflict and ratings-
shopping problem. 
2. The First Licensing Rollbacks 
In response to criticism over the NRSROs’ power to 
license, the SEC put out three proposals in July 2008 to amend 
and replace NRSRO-dependent regulatory licenses.149 These 
proposals included dismantling regulatory licenses with respect 
to broker-dealers, funds, and issuers of registered securities. 
While six commentators supported the proposals, the majority 
of commentators opposed them.150  
  
 144 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(a)(3) (2011); see also SEC 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, 
supra note 35, at 18 (“[The Equal Access Rule] allow[s] non-hired NRSROs to access 
information relating to the issuance of structured products that was previously only 
readily available to hired NRSROs. An NRSRO may then be able to break into the 
structured finance sector by providing unsolicited ratings on these securities. This 
would also allow market participants to see differences between credit ratings issued 
by a non-hired NRSRO and those issued by hired NRSRO and to observe, over time, 
the differences in the quality of the ratings.”). 
 145 At present, the Equal Access Rule is being considered as a potential 
alternative to the Franken Proposal. See infra Part III.A. In fact, the majority of 
commentators on the Franken Proposal prefer enhancing the Equal Access Rule 
instead of adopting the Franken Proposal. See infra text accompanying notes 184-87.  
 146 See SEC SEPT. 2011 SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 47, at 6-7.  
 147 Id. at 6. 
 148 See, e.g., Bo Becker & Todd Milbourn, How Did Increased Competition 
Affect Credit Ratings? 36 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Fin., Working Paper No. 09-051, 2010), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1278150 (claiming that increased competition 
from Fitch coincided with lower quality ratings from Moody’s and S&P).  
 149 See References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 58,070, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,088 (July 1, 2008); 
Security Ratings, Securities Act Release No. 8940, Exchange Act Release No. 58,071 
(July 1, 2008); References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 58,070 (July 1, 2008). 
 150 See References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 60,789, Investment Company Act Release 
No. 28,940 (Oct. 5, 2009) [hereinafter SEC October 2009 Release]. 
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As a result, the SEC left all NRSRO regulatory licenses 
in place except for one: a rule known as the municipal 
securities exception to the affiliated underwriter prohibition.151 
This first licensing rollback foreshadowed the SEC’s proposed 
approach to the new standards of creditworthiness in the post-
Dodd-Frank period by replacing a fund’s reliance on an 
NRSRO’s determination of “investment grade” with the 
professional judgment of its board.152 Since the NRSROs’ 
regulatory licensing benefit remained substantially intact 
during this period, substantive damage to the NRSROs cannot 
be attributed to this rollback. The financial crisis, however, 
took its toll. As of December 31, 2010, Moody’s reported net 
income of $508 million (down approximately 33 percent from 
December 31, 2006),153 and its market capitalization reached a 
low of $4.72 billion (down approximately 77 percent from its 
peak) in June 2010.154 
3. The Negligence Proposals 
In light of criticism that the NRSROs were held to a 
lower standard than similarly situated gatekeepers such as 
lawyers, auditors, and other CRAs,155 the SEC issued two 
releases that together would have repealed the negligence 
shield for NRSROs and required the disclosure of their credit 
ratings.156 This would have forced the NRSROs to consent to 
  
 151 17 C.F.R. 270.10f-3 (2008). The old NRSRO-dependent rule prohibited 
registered funds from knowingly purchasing municipal securities from an affiliated 
underwriter unless they were determined by an NRSRO to be investment grade. See 
SEC October 2009 Release, supra note 150, at 23-24. 
 152 See infra Part II.C.2. 
 153 See Moody’s 2010 Annual Report, supra note 120, at 27; see also Moody’s 
2006 Annual Report, supra note 120, at 20.  
 154 See Moody’s Corporation Historical Market Cap Data, supra note 121. 
 155 See, e.g., Concept Release on the Possible Rescission of Rule 436(g) Under 
the Securities Act, Securities Act Release No. 9071, Exchange Act Release No. 60,798, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 28,943 (Oct. 7, 2009) (“NRSROs describe the 
credit ratings that they provide as opinions with respect to the registrant or security of 
the registrant, and the Commission notes that other professionals provide opinions 
upon which investors rely, such as legal opinions, valuation opinions, fairness opinions 
and audit reports, and we treat these opinions as subject to the Securities Act’s 
provisions for experts, including our requirements that registrants include the consents 
of such professionals if their reports are referenced in registration statements. It 
appears to us that NRSROs and other credit rating agencies are experts similar to 
other parties subject to liability under Section 11 and that it may no longer be 
consistent with investor protection to exempt NRSROs from the provisions of the 
Securities Act applicable to experts.”). 
 156 Id.; see also Credit Ratings Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 9070, 
Exchange Act Release No. 60,797, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,942 (Oct. 7, 
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negligence exposure with respect to their ratings, much as 
auditors must do with respect to audited financial statements. 
To the extent that no NRSRO would be willing to consent, 
however, issuers would not be able to issue registered bonds.157 
Many commentators warned that this would shut down the 
registered bond market and would likely have a number of other 
collateral consequences.158 Fitch pointed out that forced exposure 
to a negligence standard would defeat the purpose of being an 
NRSRO.159 While the majority of commentators expressed an 
increased willingness to hold the CRAs accountable for their 
mistakes, most were divided on the utility of this particular set 
of proposals. To date, the SEC has not acted on it.  
4. Attempts to Negate the Seal of Approval 
Other criticism suggested that investors placed too 
much reliance on NRSRO credit ratings.160 As a result, Congress 
and the SEC took measures to change the market perception of 
NRSRO credit ratings. Congress prohibited any representation 
or implication that any NRSRO “has been designated, 
sponsored, recommended, or approved, or that the abilities or 
qualifications thereof have in any respect been passed upon, by 
the United States or any agency, officer, or employee thereof.”161 
The SEC likewise implemented a number of rules to 
cosmetically remove nonsubstantive references to NRSRO 
  
2009) (discussing proposal that would have replaced the current permissive disclosure 
standard for ratings with a required disclosure standard).  
 157 If credit ratings were required to be disclosed and the CRAs refused 
consent, issuers would not have been able to issue registered bonds because their 
registration statements would have contained an omission of a material fact required 
to be stated therein. This would have subjected such issuers to Section 11 liability.  
 158 Commentators warned of the following collateral consequences, among 
others: a migration from registered deals to unregistered deals (e.g., 144A deals), a 
contraction in ratings coverage, and less accurate defensive ratings due to incentives 
favoring caution rather than candor. See, e.g., Letter from Robert E. Buckholz, Jr., 
Chair, & Trevor Ogle, Sec’y, Comm. on Sec. Regulation, N.Y.C. Bar to Elizabeth M. 
Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n (Mar. 1, 2010); Letter from Deven Sharma, 
President, Standard & Poor’s to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 
14, 2009); Letter from Michel Madelain, Chief Operating Officer, Moody’s Investors 
Servs. to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 14, 2009), all available 
at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-24-09/s72409.shtml. 
 159 See Letter from Charles D. Brown, General Counsel, Fitch Ratings, to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 14, 2009) (“The proposal seems to 
defeat the entire purpose of becoming an NRSRO if one of the perceived benefits of 
recognition (use of the credit ratings by registrants) creates a significant new liability.”). 
 160 See, e.g., SEC October 2009 Release, supra note 150, at 1 (“NRSRO ratings 
in Commission rules may have contributed to an undue reliance on those ratings by 
market participants.”); Partnoy, supra note 67, at 1. 
 161 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15E(f)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(f)(1) (2006). 
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ratings in statutes and regulations.162 Its initiative explicitly 
sought to negate the perception of a seal of approval.163  
The market, however, did not change any of its previous 
habits due to these signals to stop over-relying on NRSRO 
ratings, nor did it punish the Big Three in light of the 
widespread negative media attention focused on them during 
the financial crisis of 2008. The Wall Street Journal pointed out 
that “[the Big Three’s] dominance of the business didn’t change 
after they lost some credibility for being overly optimistic about 
the performance of thousands of mortgage-related bonds before 
and during the financial crisis.”164 It also remarked that the 
market continued to ignore the judgments of lesser established 
NRSROs such as Egan-Jones.165 Some attribute this 
phenomenon to “sticky” market practices, which refers to the 
strong incentives that market participants have to honor 
existing market norms, such as relying on the Big Three’s 
credit ratings, even if they appear to be performing poorly.166 
While some may also attribute the phenomenon to the 
continued dependence on NRSRO regulatory licenses during 
this period, this does not explain why the other seven NRSROs 
had so little success in increasing their market share in 
relation to the Big Three. The most convincing reason for the 
phenomenon is that “no other ratings firm[s] can come close to 
matching the number of analysts, broad coverage and decades 
of experience.”167 Thus, just as the failure of the Big Three 
during the financial crisis of 2008 did not impact their market 
share, attempts to negate the government’s seal of approval 
  
 162 These changes were in addition to the aborted proposals to remove 
regulatory licenses from SEC regulations and the first licensing rollback discussed 
above. See SEC October 2009 Release, supra note 150, at 11-14. An example of such a 
cosmetic change was the test to determine whether an Alternative Trading System 
(ATS) must be registered as an exchange. This test previously depended upon the 
number of investment grade and non-investment grade corporate debt securities 
trading on the ATS. The SEC consolidated these two categories into “corporate debt 
securities” to remove the superfluous “investment grade” distinction. See id. at 7-9.  
 163 Id. at 36 (The SEC stated that the “initiative [was] designed to address the 
concern that the inclusion in the Commission’s rules and forms of requirements 
relating to security ratings could create the appearance that the Commission had, in 
effect, given its ‘official seal of approval’ on ratings, which could adversely affect the 
quality of due diligence and investment analysis . . . .”). 
 164 Neumann, supra note 142. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Hill, supra note 17, at 144 (“Market practices are sticky, and market actors 
have strong incentives to abide by them. Even now, after Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, 
and Fitch have done so badly, and when other rating agencies are NRSROs, the Big 
Three are still highly influential.”).  
 167 Neumann, supra note 142. 
2012] NRSRO NULLIFICATION 1045 
had no substantive impact on the Big Three’s market share and 
no positive effect on the growth of the smaller seven.  
5. NRSRO Regulation  
In light of the SEC’s inability to regulate and oversee 
the NRSROs under the Advisers Act, Congress adopted a new, 
narrowly tailored regulatory regime for NRSROs. NRSRO 
regulation imposes substantial new legal burdens on the 
NRSROs without providing any substantive NRSRO-specific 
benefits. The new legal burdens include new disclosure 
obligations,168 recordkeeping rules,169 prohibitions on unfair 
business practices,170 management of certain conflicts of 
interest,171 prohibition of other conflicts of interest,172 and new 
and enhanced SEC penalty and examination powers.173  
Although the new regulatory regime also provides some 
new legal benefits, such benefits do not bear on the NRSRO 
Nullification analysis. Two of these benefits were designed to 
apply equally to all CRAs: protection from SEC or State 
regulation of the substance of credit ratings and the procedures 
and methodologies used to determine them,174 and protection 
  
 168 Such disclosure obligations include the disclosure of performance statistics, 
procedures and methodologies, and permitted conflicts of interest. See Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 15E(a)(1)(B), (a)(3), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78o-7(a)(1)(B), (a)(3) (West 
2011). Rules were also adopted requiring disclosure of rating action histories for all 
credit ratings initially determined on or after June 26, 2007. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-
2(d)(3) (2011). On a confidential basis, NRSROs must disclose, among other things, a 
list of their twenty largest clients and various financial statements. See Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 15E(a)(1)(B)(viii), (k), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-7(a)(1)(B)(viii), (k). 
The SEC requires such disclosures to be made using Form NRSRO, which must be 
made publicly available on such NRSRO’s website. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-1 (2011) 
[hereinafter Form NRSRO].  
 169 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-2. 
 170 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15E(i), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-7(i); see 
also 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-6. 
 171 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15E(h), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-7(h); see 
also 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17g-5(a), (b). 
 172 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-7(h); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(c). 
 173 The SEC has the power to penalize the NRSROs in that they could lose 
their NRSRO status or be censured, limited, or suspended if they commit one or more 
enumerated bad acts, including securities laws violations or felonies, or if they fail to 
maintain adequate financial and managerial resources to consistently produce credit 
ratings with integrity. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15E(d), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-
7(d). These powers are in addition to their general powers under the Exchange Act. 
See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 21, 21A, 21B, 21C, 32, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78u, 
78u-1, 78u-2, 78u-3, 78ff. The SEC also has examination authority over all records of 
NRSROs. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 17(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78q.  
 174 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15E(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c) 
(“Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, or any other provision of law, 
neither the Commission nor any State (or political subdivision thereof) may regulate 
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against private rights of action (now repealed).175 The other 
benefits include an exemption for the NRSROs from 
registration under the Advisers Act176 and the NRSROs’ 
voluntary withdrawal right together with the CRAs’ voluntary 
registration right.177 The former does not bear on NRSRO 
Nullification because the SEC has long treated NRSRO 
registrations as voluntary under the Advisors Act and 
continues to treat non-NRSRO registrations in the same 
manner. While the latter permits NRSRO Nullification, it does 
not, by itself, affect the decision to opt in or out of the 
regulatory regime. Since this regime is NRSRO-specific, 
however, regulation under the new regime continues to confer 
the same, if not an enhanced, reputational benefit as regulation 
under the Advisers Act did. The new NRSRO-specific legal 
burdens, on the other hand, impose new costs that weigh in 
favor of NRSRO Nullification.  
C. Post-Dodd-Frank (2010–Present) 
After the passage of Dodd-Frank in July 2010, most of 
the distinct financial benefits of NRSRO status from the 
previous eras were called into question or removed: the club 
was no longer exclusive, measures were proposed to increase 
competition, the power to license was set to be substantially 
eliminated on the federal level by July 2012, and the 
negligence shield was repealed (though, as described herein, 
negligence exposure was not imposed). In addition, the legal 
burdens of NRSRO status were again increased substantially 
through heightened regulation. In spite of reputational damage 
from the financial crisis of 2008, the Big Three’s credibility 
nonetheless appeared to remain mostly intact while the 
  
the substance of credit ratings or the procedures and methodologies by which any 
nationally recognized statistical rating organization determines credit ratings.”). 
 175 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15E(m), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-7(m) 
(West 2008), amended by Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 933(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 
1883 (2010). Dodd-Frank’s amendment to section 15E(m) repealed the NRSROs’ 
protection against private rights of action granted under CRARA, which previously 
read as follows: “Nothing in this section may be construed as creating any private right 
of action, and no report furnished by a nationally recognized statistical rating 
organization in accordance with this section or section 17 shall create a private right of 
action under section 18 or any other provision of law.” Id.  
 176 See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(11)(F), 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-
2(11)(F) (West 2011) (explicitly exempting NRSROs from the definition of investment 
adviser but not CRAs).  
 177 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15E(e)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-7(e)(1); 
id. § 15E(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-7(a). 
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opinions of the other seven NRSROs continued to be mostly 
ignored. It remains to be seen how the two most critical 
unresolved items—the Franken Proposal and the new 
standards of creditworthiness—will impact this calculus once 
they are finalized. 
1. The Prospect of a New Elite Club 
Since expanding the NRSRO club and other initial 
measures to foster competition among the NRSROs did not 
produce tangible results, Congress instead began focusing on a 
different strategy to increase competition: encouraging the 
existing members of the club to compete over accuracy. The 
leading proposal, which has not yet been (and may not be) 
adopted, is the Franken Proposal.178 This proposal seeks to 
increase competition among the existing members of the club 
by creating an environment where all NRSROs compete over 
accuracy on a level playing field without having to inflate their 
ratings to win business.179 It purports to do this by creating a 
series of benefits that only accrue to a new elite club for which 
only NRSROs would be eligible. The members of the new elite 
club would be known as qualified NRSROs (QNRSROs).180 To 
join this new elite club and get these benefits, NRSROs would 
have to be selected by the investor-controlled CRA Board.181 The 
CRA Board would rate the QNRSROs based on their track 
records for accuracy and reward the best performers, over time, 
with the most business.182 This would purportedly encourage a 
race to the top to issue accurate ratings instead of today’s race 
to the bottom to assign issuer-friendly ratings.183  
  
 178 See supra note 95. 
 179 See 156 CONG. REC. S3664, 3676 (daily ed. May 13, 2010) (statement of Sen. 
Charles Schumer) (“[T]he provision Senator Franken is offering and I am proud to 
cosponsor goes to the heart of the conflict of interest. . . . [T]he smaller rating agencies and 
investor-paid agencies will have a level playing field to compete against the big three.”). 
 180 See Franken Proposal, supra note 95, § 15E(w)(1)(B).  
 181 While this new membership requirement creates a new barrier to entry, it 
appears that such barrier is meant to be exceedingly low to weed out only those 
NRSROs that are simply unqualified to rate structured finance products. Senator 
Franken has been clear that one of the express purposes of his proposal is to give the 
smaller NRSROs a level playing field to compete with the Big Three. See 156 CONG. 
REC. S3664, 3674 (daily ed. May 13, 2010) (statement of Sen. Al Franken) (“Standard & 
Poor’s and Moody’s and Fitch do about, what, 94 percent of the business. The other 
agencies will get a chance because what will be rewarded is accuracy.”).  
 182 See Franken Proposal, supra note 95, § 15E(w)(5).  
 183 For an analysis of the Franken Proposal and recommendations for 
improving it, see infra Parts III.A.1.b.I and IV.A.  
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The SEC is also considering five alternative proposals to 
the Franken Proposal to create incentives for NRSROs to 
compete over accuracy. These proposals include relying only on 
the existing Equal Access Rule; creating an investor-owned 
NRSRO to compete with the existing issuer-paid NRSROs; 
requiring the price-tag for ratings to be split between issuers, 
secondary market sellers, and investors; legally mandating a 
user-pays system; and preserving the issuer-pays model but 
putting the payment decision into the hands of security 
holders.184 These proposals vary with respect to the allocation of 
new NRSRO-specific benefits and burdens.185 Of these, the large 
majority of commentators support relying only on the existing 
Equal Access Rule with certain enhancements, even though no 
NRSRO has yet used it,186 while a smaller segment favors 
implementing a form of the Franken Proposal.187 None of the 
other alternatives appear to have gained much traction.  
Congress ordered the SEC to study the Franken 
Proposal and alternative systems and deliver a report by July 
2012 with their recommendations.188 After delivering the report, 
to the extent necessary or appropriate in the public interest or 
for the protection of investors, the SEC must establish an 
assignment system for selecting NRSROs to determine initial 
credit ratings for structured finance products that prevents the 
issuer and other issuer-aligned parties from selecting the 
NRSRO that will determine and monitor initial credit ratings.189 
It must implement the Franken Proposal unless it determines 
  
 184 See Solicitation of Comment, supra note 95, at 38-47.  
 185 For an analysis of the alternatives to the Franken Proposal, see infra Part 
III.A.1.b. 
 186 See Letter from Robert Dobilas, President, Morningstar Credit Ratings LLC, 
to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n 6 (Sept. 13, 2011) [hereinafter 
Morningstar Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-629/4629-24.pdf (“Since 
the [Equal Access Rule] became effective, we know of no NRSRO that has issued an 
unsolicited initial rating as a result of the information available under this rule.”).  
 187 See generally Comments on Solicitation of Comment to Assist in Study on 
Assigned Credit Ratings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-
629/4-629.shtml (last visited Jan. 22, 2012) [hereinafter Comments on Solicitation].  
 188 See Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 939F(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 1889 (2010). 
 189 See id. § 939F(d). Notably, DBRS points out that “[a]lthough Section 939F 
is awkwardly constructed . . . the correct reading of the provision requires the 
Commission to make the threshold public interest/protection of investors 
determination before engaging in any new rulemaking on assigned credit ratings.” 
Letter from Daniel Curry, President, & Mary Keogh, Managing Dir., Regulatory 
Affairs, DBRS Ltd., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n 2 (Sept. 13, 
2011) [hereinafter DBRS Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-629/ 
4629-21.pdf. This means that the SEC need not adopt a system separating issuer 
payment and selection to the extent it finds that it is not necessary or appropriate in 
the public interest or for the protection of investors.  
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that an alternative system would be better.190 The resolution of 
this item has the potential to bestow important new benefits 
upon the NRSROs, but it also has the potential to impose 
significant new burdens. 
2. The Elimination of Most Regulatory Licenses 
As part of Dodd-Frank, Congress eliminated 
substantially all NRSRO-dependent regulatory licenses on the 
federal level effective July 2012 by striking statutory 
references to NRSRO credit ratings191 and causing each federal 
agency to do the same with respect to their regulations.192 In 
each case, the relevant federal agencies, such as the SEC, must 
then replace such references or any “requirement of reliance on 
credit ratings and . . . substitute in such regulations such 
standard of credit-worthiness as each respective agency shall 
determine as appropriate for such regulations.”193 A question 
remains, however, whether such NRSRO-dependent regulatory 
licenses will reemerge unscathed as part of the new standards 
meant to replace them. Some market participants contend that 
the requirement to replace such references or any requirement 
of reliance on credit ratings plainly forbids the federal agencies 
from incorporating any new form of reliance on NRSRO credit 
ratings into their new standards of creditworthiness, much like 
the SEC did with the first licensing rollback.194 Other market 
participants, however, interpret the “determine as appropriate” 
clause to mean that the federal agencies have discretion to 
incorporate NRSRO ratings as part of the new standards of 
creditworthiness so long as such incorporation is consistent 
with Congress’s intent to reduce, as opposed to eliminate, 
reliance on ratings.195  
  
 190 Dodd-Frank § 939. 
 191 See id. 
 192 See id. § 939A.  
 193 Id. § 939A(b) (emphasis added). 
 194 See, e.g., Letter from Dennis M. Kelleher, President & CEO, & Stephen W. 
Hall, Sec. Specialist, Better Mkts., Inc., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. 
Comm’n 7 (July 5, 2011) [hereinafter Better Markets Letter] (“The Dodd-Frank Act 
requires the Commission and other agencies to remove references to credit ratings from 
their regulations, and to substitute alternative standards of credit-worthiness as each 
agency deems appropriate. Allowing broker-dealers to continue using credit ratings 
when assessing credit risk would violate this statutory mandate.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 195 See, e.g., Letter from Suzanne Rothwell, Managing Member, Rothwell 
Consulting LLC, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n 7 (July 5, 2011) 
(“It is unclear whether the ‘as appropriate’ language reflects the intention of Congress 
that each agency retains some flexibility to continue to rely on credit rating standards 
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In its proposed new standards of creditworthiness, the 
SEC has taken the latter view by including partial reliance on 
NRSRO credit ratings as part of a broader professional 
judgment analysis.196 It appears, however, that such partial 
reliance on NRSRO credit ratings would be permissive—not 
mandatory—so investment fiduciaries would ultimately decide 
whether such partial reliance would be appropriate in 
satisfying their legal duties.197  
Moreover, it appears that the SEC would not limit such 
permissive reliance to NRSRO credit ratings.198 Thus, 
fiduciaries could equally rely on non-NRSRO credit ratings to 
the extent they deem appropriate and consistent with their 
legal duties. Since reliance on credit ratings for these purposes 
would no longer be limited to NRSROs, this would succeed in 
eliminating substantially all NRSRO-dependent regulatory 
licenses on the federal level. Many of the comment letters 
received to date, especially with respect to the rules governing 
money market funds, oppose this result and request that the 
SEC find a way to preserve the NRSRO-dependent rules or 
lobby Congress to amend Dodd-Frank to this end.199 
Although NRSRO-specific regulatory licenses may be 
substantially eliminated on the federal level in the near future, 
they will not be defunct. A handful of NRSRO-dependent 
  
in appropriate situations. As reflected in the statement in the Proposing Release, 
Congress explained that Section 939A of Dodd-Frank is designed ‘[t]o reduce the 
reliance on ratings.’ This explanation appears to indicate that the SEC is only required 
to ‘reduce’ rather than ‘eliminate’ entirely all references to credit ratings.”). 
 196 See, e.g., SEC April 2011 Release, supra note 112, at 11 (“Under the 
proposed amendments, a broker-dealer, when assessing credit risk, could consider the 
following factors, to the extent appropriate, with respect to each security: . . . Internal 
or external credit risk assessments (i.e., whether credit assessments developed 
internally by the broker-dealer or externally by a credit rating agency, irrespective of 
its status as an NRSRO, express a view as to the credit risk associated with a 
particular security . . . .)”); see also References to Credit Ratings in Certain Investment 
Company Act Rules and Forms, Securities Act Release No. 9193, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 29,592, at 9 (Mar. 3, 2011) (“Fund boards of directors (which typically 
rely on the fund’s adviser) would still be able to consider quality determinations 
prepared by outside sources, including NRSRO ratings, that fund advisers conclude are 
credible and reliable, in making credit risk determinations.”).  
 197 See sources cited supra note 195. 
 198 See sources cited supra note 195.  
 199 See, e.g., Letter from Timothy W. Cameron, Managing Dir., SIFMA’s Asset 
Mgmt. Grp., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n 2-3 (Apr. 18, 2011) 
(arguing that ratings provisions should be retained in Rule 2a-7 and supporting efforts 
to urge Congress to amend Section 939A of Dodd-Frank to retain the references to 
ratings); see also Letter from C. David Messman, Sec’y & Chief Legal Officer, Wells 
Fargo Funds Mgmt., LLC, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n 1 (Apr. 
25, 2011) (same).  
2012] NRSRO NULLIFICATION 1051 
regulatory licenses will still remain on the federal level200 in 
addition to state NRSRO-dependent regulatory licenses201 and 
those in the contracts and other documents of private entities. 
NRSROs will also continue to benefit from international 
regulatory licenses though none would bear on the NRSRO 
Nullification analysis.202 Thus, a fraction of the previous power to 
license will continue to be a financial benefit for the NRSROs. 
Given that the full scope of the regulatory licensing benefit 
remains unresolved, it is impossible to speculate how the 
NRSROs’ bottom lines may be affected in the future by this 
impending change. 
3. The Repeal of the Negligence Shield 
As part of Dodd-Frank, Congress finally repealed the 
NRSROs’ long-standing negligence shield under Section 11 for 
ratings disclosed in a registration statement,203 but 
perplexingly, Congress did not thereby expose the NRSROs to 
negligence. This is because Congress did not repeal the 
NRSROs’ existing right to refuse consent to negligence 
exposure,204 nor did it require that any ratings had to be 
disclosed (as the SEC considered at one point).205 As they had 
threatened to do for some time, the NRSROs withheld their 
  
 200 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C.A. § 1426(c)(6) (West 2011) (depends upon at least one 
major credit rating agency); id. § 1715z-22a(2)(A) (depends upon Standard and Poor’s 
or any other nationally recognized rating agency); 29 U.S.C. § 1341(b)(5)(B) (2006) 
(depends on NRSROs); id. § 1083 (builds term “investment grade” into the definition of 
“corporate bond yield curve”); id. § 1306(E)(iv) (references “investment grade corporate 
bonds”); 20 U.S.C. § 1087-2(d), (r) (2006) (depends on NRSROs); 23 U.S.C. § 601 (2006) 
(depends on rating agencies defined as NRSROs). 
 201 The most significant regulatory licenses that survive Dodd-Frank on the 
state level are those in insurance regulation. See John Patrick Hunt, Credit Ratings in 
Insurance Regulation: The Missing Piece of Financial Reform, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1667, 1686 (2011) (“If the insurance regulators maintain rating-dependent regulation, 
then Dodd-Frank’s purpose in eliminating credit ratings from federal financial regulation 
will be substantially frustrated.”). 
 202 Since NRSRO status is a U.S. legal concept, foreign regulatory schemes 
and treaties generally do not rely on NRSROs, but rather their own parallel construct. 
For example, under the Basel III framework, the parallel to NRSROs are external 
credit assessment institutions or “ECAIs.” See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, BASEL III: A GLOBAL 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 52 
(2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf. But see SEC REPORT OF 2003, 
supra note 9, at 8 n.22 (“In El Salvador . . . a rating agency can register as a ‘classifier 
of risk’ under the country’s securities laws if the rating agency is an NRSRO as 
recognized by the SEC.” (citations omitted)).  
 203 See supra note 29.  
 204 See supra note 31. 
 205 See supra note 156. 
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consent to allow issuers to disclose their ratings in future 
registration statements in order to avoid such exposure.206 In 
spite of some convincing rhetoric that Congress intended 
negligence exposure through the repeal of the negligence 
shield,207 the SEC issued temporary guidance assuring the 
market that the NRSROs’ interpretation of their consent right 
was correct and that previously required ratings disclosure 
could henceforth be omitted.208  
By removing this NRSRO-specific negligence shield, 
Congress put the NRSROs and non-NRSROs on a level playing 
field in this respect. As a result, registration statements have 
generally not included ratings disclosure since the end of July 
2010, although issuers have continued to include ratings 
disclosure in other types of prospectuses.209 While the repeal of 
the negligence shield opens up the possibility that CRAs may 
seek to distinguish themselves from the pack by voluntarily 
consenting to negligence exposure in the future, there is 
currently no indication that any would be willing to do so. Since 
the negligence shield no longer provides a benefit to the 
NRSROs, however, it removes a distinction that previously 
weighed against NRSRO Nullification.210 In addition, Ratings 
  
 206 See supra note 32. 
 207 See supra note 29. 
 208 See Ford No-Action Letter, supra note 32 (“[D]isclosure of a rating in a 
registration statement requires inclusion of the consent by the rating agency to be 
named as an expert. . . . Pending further notice, the Division will not recommend 
enforcement action to the Commission if an asset-backed issuer as defined in Item 
1101 of Regulation AB omits the ratings disclosure required by Item 1103(a)(9) and 
1120 of Regulation AB from a prospectus that is part of a registration statement 
relating to an offering of asset-backed securities.”).  
 209 Issuers can disclose credit ratings in free writing prospectuses because 
such prospectuses do not become a part of the final registration statement and 
therefore are not subject to Section 11 liability. Such free writing prospectuses can 
include information, such as credit ratings, even though they are not included in the 
registration statement. See Securities Act of 1933 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77j(b) (West 
2011); see also 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.408(b), 433 (2011). Typically, such free writing 
prospectuses are term-sheets filed with the SEC at the time the issuers begin selling 
their securities. See, e.g., Ford Credit Auto Lease Trust 2011-A, Free Writing 
Prospectus (June 27, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
1524342/000095012311062759/u50533f2fwp.htm (showing credit ratings by Moody’s 
and Fitch). In addition to free writing prospectuses, permissive disclosure of NRSRO 
credit ratings was also historically allowed in Rule 134 tombstone advertisements 
without Section 11 liability. See Regulation S-K § 10(c), 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(c). The SEC 
rescinded this rule in July 2011 effective September 2, 2011. See Security Ratings, 
Securities Act Release No. 9245, at 6 (July 27, 2011) (“[W]e are removing Rule 
134(a)(17) under the Securities Act.”). 
 210 There is currently a pending bill in Congress, however, seeking to restore 
Rule 436(g) and thus reinstate the NRSRO-specific negligence shield. See Asset-Backed 
Market Stabilization Act of 2011, H.R. 1539, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr1539rh/pdf/BILLS-112hr1539rh.pdf. 
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Reform introduced two other forms of heightened liability—
enhanced SEC penalty powers211 and exposure to private rights of 
action under Section 18 of the Exchange Act212—that are also 
NRSRO-specific.213  
4. The Demise of the Seal of Approval 
Dodd-Frank, unlike previous efforts, substantially 
eliminated references to NRSRO credit ratings on the federal 
level and, by repealing the negligence shield, eliminated such 
references in registration statements. The elimination of federal 
government reliance on NRSRO ratings, which has not yet 
become effective, would appear to officially sever any perception 
that NRSRO credit ratings are government-sponsored (at least 
at the federal level). The elimination of credit ratings from 
registration statements, moreover, has signaled to investors that 
the federal government is no longer making it easy for investors 
to find and rely on such ratings even though they are still 
available on NRSRO websites and in nonregistration statement 
prospectuses.214 Moreover, the fact that the NRSROs refused to 
accept negligence exposure should raise a red flag for investors 
since the NRSROs themselves do not have sufficient confidence 
in their ratings to bear this exposure voluntarily.  
While the demise of the government’s purported seal of 
approval will significantly reduce the visibility of NRSRO 
credit ratings in statutes, regulations, and registration 
statements, there has been no shortage of visibility for the Big 
Three from the media, especially in the realm of debt sold by 
  
 211 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15E(p)(4), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-7(p)(4). 
Nonetheless, the SEC has indicated that its existing powers under the Exchange Act to 
“impose fines, penalties, and other sanctions on an NRSRO for violations of Section 
15E of the Exchange Act and the rules thereunder” are already “sufficiently broad” 
such that it is not imposing new fines at this time. See Proposed Rules for Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 64,514, at 53 
(May 18, 2011) [hereinafter SEC May 2011 Release].  
 212 See supra note 175; see also Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 932, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) (replacing various references to “furnishing” with references to 
“filing.”). Filing, as opposed to furnishing, brings reports and other documents filed 
with the SEC (e.g., Form NRSRO) within the purview of liability under Sections 18 of 
the Exchange Act for false or misleading statements made in such reports or other 
documents. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 18, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78r (West 2012). 
 213 Dodd-Frank also lowered the pleading standard in 10b-5 litigation against 
all CRAs and added a due diligence defense, which will heighten the settlement value 
and ability to win judgments against the CRAs in future actions and will promote 
increased due diligence. See Dodd-Frank § 933.  
 214 See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
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sovereign nations.215 Most significantly, S&P sought to make it 
abundantly clear that it is at odds with the U.S. government by 
taking the unprecedented step of downgrading the United 
States’ triple-A credit rating to double-A in August 2011.216 
Tremendous volatility in the stock markets followed. And while 
Egan-Jones, one of the seven smaller NRSROs, beat S&P to the 
punch weeks earlier, “[a]lmost no one paid attention.”217 This 
shows yet again that, in spite of any perceived seal of approval 
attributed to NRSRO status, the smaller NRSROs do not share 
this benefit equally with the Big Three. The seal of approval 
benefit may have always been illusory.  
Congress’s message, moreover, was not solely that 
investors and regulators should reduce reliance on ratings. 
Through heightened regulation and the reintroduction of due 
diligence, Congress also signaled that the watchdog is now back 
on guard. This competing message may prove especially salient 
if the Franken Proposal is adopted. Since QNRSROs would have 
a new means of regulatory visibility and a new investor-
controlled CRA Board to signal the value of NRSRO ratings to 
investors, this could provide an unprecedented form of visibility 
and positive press for lesser established NRSROs. It could 
thereby reverse the long-time reliance on national recognition as 
a proxy for safety and quality and replace it with an objective 
assessment of good performance. This might introduce a new 
investor-sanctioned seal of approval that could provide 
significant reputational benefits to the best performers.218 
  
 215 See, e.g., Stephen Fidler, Greek Debt Hits a New Low, WALL ST. J., June 14, 
2011, at C3, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303848104576 
383660422679124.html?KEYWORDS=Greece+rating (discussing S&P’s downgrade of 
Greece to below investment grade); Patricia Kowsmann, Portugal’s Debt Agency Slams 
Moody’s, WALL ST. J. (July 8, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230 
3544604576433401104276740.html?KEYWORDS=Greece+downgrade (discussing Moody’s 
downgrade of Portugal to below investment grade); David Weidner, Rating the Ratings 
Firms: An “I” for “Ignore”, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424053111903885604576486780718385072.html?KEYWORDS=weidner+rating 
(discussing why the market should downgrade Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch by ignoring them).  
 216 See Damian Paletta & Matt Phillips, S&P Strips U.S. of Top Credit Rating, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2011, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001 
424053111903366504576491421339802788.html?KEYWORDS=SP+downgrade.  
 217 See Neumann, supra note 142. 
 218 To make clear that there would be no government seal of approval, the 
Franken Proposal proposes the following disclaimer: “This initial rating has not been 
evaluated, approved, or certified by the Government of the United States or by a 
Federal agency.” See Franken Proposal, supra note 95, § 15E(w)(6).  
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5. Heightened NRSRO Regulation  
In light of the new problems observed during the 
financial crisis of 2008, Congress adopted a number of 
heightened regulatory measures. These measures once again 
increase NRSRO-specific burdens without adding any 
offsetting benefits. Such heightened regulation includes new 
and enhanced disclosure obligations,219 new and enhanced 
recordkeeping rules,220 additional measures to combat conflicts 
of interest,221 the establishment of an Office of Credit Ratings,222 
corporate governance reforms,223 new qualification standards for 
rating analysts,224 new whistle-blower duties,225 a duty to 
consider information from sources other than the issuer when 
making rating decisions,226 procedures to assess the probability 
that an issuer will default, clear definitions of symbols used to 
denote credit ratings, and consistent use of any such symbols.227 
As a result of the expected high costs of compliance, some CRAs 
that have been considering registration as NRSROs, such as 
  
 219 See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 15E(q)-(s), 15 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 78o-7(q)-(s) (West 2011). In addition, the SEC has proposed (1) an enhanced Form 
NRSRO including a new standard format Transition/Default Matrix that all NRSROs 
would have to use to show performance data; (2) enhanced rating history disclosures 
for each rating outstanding on or after June 26, 2007; and (3) a new Information 
Disclosure Form to accompany each rating action, which will include the disclosure of 
thirteen items that include the main assumptions used in constructing procedures and 
methodologies, potential limitations of credit ratings, a description of the data relied on 
for the purpose of determining such ratings, and the use of third party due diligence 
services. See SEC May 2011 Release, supra note 211, at 56-88, 99-119, 459-63.  
 220 See SEC May 2011 Release, supra note 211, at 315-19 (discussing proposed 
paragraphs (a)(9) and (b)(12)-(15) to be amended to Rule 17g-2, 17 C.F.R. 240.17g-2). 
 221 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 932(a)(4), 124 Stat. 1376, 
1874-76 (2010); SEC May 2011 Release, supra note 211, at 25-26, 37-45 (discussing 
proposed paragraph (c)(8) to Rule 17g-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5 and proposed new Rule 
17g-8(c), which would be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-8).  
 222 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 15E(p)(1), (3), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78o-
7(p)(1), (3). The Office of Credit Ratings will monitor ratings determinations, promote 
ratings accuracy, “ensure that such ratings are not unduly influenced by conflicts,” and 
conduct an annual examination of each NRSRO. Id. As of September 30, 2011, this 
office was not established due to the failure of the House and Senate Appropriations 
Subcommittees on Financial Services and General Government to provide the 
necessary approval. See SEC SEPT. 2011 SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 47, at 8. The 
proposed CRA Board under the Franken Proposal, by contrast, would likely not have 
such funding problems since it would be permitted to levy fees periodically from the 
QNRSROs and QNRSRO applicants. See Franken Proposal, supra note 95, 
§ 15E(w)(2)(D).  
 223 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15E(t), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-7(t).  
 224 See Dodd-Frank § 936. 
 225 Id. § 934. 
 226 Id. § 935. 
 227 Id. § 938. 
1056 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:3  
Rapid Ratings,228 have so far refrained from doing so.229 A 
current NRSRO, DBRS, suggestively points out that two 
current NRSROs, JCR and R&I, have withdrawn their 
registrations with respect to structured finance products and 
have thus stopped rating such securities due to the new costs, 
while another NRSRO, A.M. Best, has curtailed the expansion 
of its rating activities as a result.230 Yet another NRSRO, Kroll, 
advocates for the expansion of the Equal Access Rule, which 
provides an NRSRO-specific benefit, to include all CRAs.231 This 
suggests that Kroll may want the ability to take advantage of 
this benefit without subjection to the legal burdens of the 
regulatory regime. Along the same lines, Kroll has described 
the new disclosure rules as a “disincentive to any credit rating 
agency considering becoming an NRSRO.”232 Similarly, A.M. 
Best and Egan-Jones have described the new disclosure rules 
as “disproportionately hurt[ing]” and “counter-productive for” 
the smaller NRSROs.233 
In summation, NRSRO status has become much less 
attractive than it used to be. Of the three main financial 
benefits from earlier eras—lack of competition, regulatory 
licensing power, and the negligence shield—only a fraction of 
the regulatory licensing power remains and the Equal Access 
Rule provides a benefit that no NRSROs have yet used. In 
addition, a reputational benefit remains by virtue of the 
message sent to the market that such NRSROs are regulated. 
Nonetheless, the market continues to listen to the opinions of 
the Big Three and mostly ignores the seven smallest NRSROs, 
  
 228 See History, RAPID RATINGS: FIN. HEALTH RATINGS, http://www.rapidratings.com/ 
page.php?25 (last visited Jan. 22, 2012) (“Rapid Ratings may or may not apply for [NRSRO] 
designation, depending on how the SEC moves forwards on a variety of rule amendment 
recommendations put forth in June 2008.”). 
 229 See Neumann, supra note 142 (Rapid Ratings “decided not to seek SEC 
approval because of compliance and administrative costs. . . . DBRS [] said it is worried 
that the costs of complying with tougher disclosures if the rules go through could 
discourage upstarts from seeking SEC approval.”). 
 230 See DBRS Letter, supra note 189, at 8 nn.33-34. 
 231 See Letter from James Nadler, President of Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Inc. 
on Release No. 34-64,456, File No. 4-629, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. 
Comm’n 8 (Sept. 13, 2011) [hereinafter Kroll Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/4-629/4629-15.pdf. 
 232 See Letter from Jules B. Kroll, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, Kroll Bond 
Rating Agency, Inc., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n 11 (Aug. 8, 
2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-11/s71811-36.pdf.  
 233 See Letter from Larry G. Mayewski, Exec. Vice President, A.M. Best Co., to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n 2 (Aug. 8, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-11/s71811-39.pdf; Letter from Sean J. Egan, Egan-
Jones Ratings Co., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n 1 (Aug. 5, 2011), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-11/s71811-27.pdf. 
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showing that NRSRO status confers no meaningful seal of 
approval. Finally, the legal burdens of NRSRO status have 
substantially increased through heightened regulation. While 
the tipping point towards NRSRO Nullification has not been 
reached for any of the club’s current members, the evidence 
suggests that today’s NRSROs are paying careful attention to 
the benefit/burden calculation. Depending on the resolution of 
today’s unresolved items, withdrawal from the club appears to 
be a realistic possibility.  
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF TODAY’S UNRESOLVED ITEMS  
This part identifies and discusses the financial and 
reputational implications that today’s most critical unresolved 
items—the Franken Proposal and the new standards of 
creditworthiness—will have on the NRSROs’ decision to 
withdraw from Ratings Reform. It then assesses the impact that 
today’s existing distinctions in concert with such unresolved 
items will have on this decision and the legal implications of 
NRSRO Nullification. This part also assesses the extent to 
which such items and their alternatives will promote accurate 
and reliable ratings. It concludes that certain proposals for 
resolving these items would be more likely to tip the balance 
toward NRSRO Nullification, while other proposals would be 
more likely to prevent this result, and that the smaller seven are 
more likely to opt out of Ratings Reform than the Big Three. 
A. Financial and Reputational Implications 
1. The Franken Proposal and its Alternatives 
a. The Franken Proposal 
Mechanically, the Franken Proposal would require the 
SEC to create a self-regulatory organization (which could also 
be a public or private utility),234 known as the CRA Board, 
whose directors would be controlled by—and therefore aligned 
with—the investor community.235 The CRA Board would 
  
 234 See Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 939F(a)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1889 (2010). 
 235 See Franken Proposal, supra note 95, § 15E(w)(2)(C) (“The [CRA] Board 
shall initially be composed of an odd number of members selected from the 
industry . . . . [N]ot less than a majority shall be representatives of the investor 
industry who do not represent issuers . . . not less than 1 member should be a 
representative of the issuer industry . . . not less than 1 member should be a 
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determine the QNRSRO club’s membership through an 
application process whereby they would assess, among other 
things, the institutional and technical capacity of each NRSRO 
to issue the required ratings.236 Unlike the high barrier to entry 
that prevented non-NRSROs from becoming NRSROs prior to 
2006, the QNRSRO barrier is intended to impose an 
exceedingly low threshold for entry.237 Its goal of divorcing 
issuer selection from issuer payment would mitigate the issuer-
pays conflict and the ratings-shopping problem. The CRA 
Board would seek to achieve this goal by matching QNRSROs 
and issuers with respect to the initial rating for a structured 
finance product that the issuer would presumably purchase in 
advance.238 The match would be made through a random 
assignment system, such as a lottery or rotation, and the CRA 
Board would rate the best performers and then increase or 
decrease a QNRSRO’s market share in such matches based on 
accurate performance over time.239 At least once each year, the 
CRA Board would assess the performance of the QNRSROs.240 
Issuers would still be free to shop for and purchase second 
ratings on the open market,241 and the Equal Access Rule would 
continue to permit nonhired NRSROs to compete through 
unsolicited ratings. 
This proposal has been met with substantial criticism 
from the majority of today’s NRSROs.242 In particular, there is a 
concern that the CRA Board would be poorly suited to 
determine which NRSROs should be in the QNRSRO club and 
how assignments should be allocated among them. The smaller 
NRSROs, for whom the proposal was purportedly developed, 
are concerned that they will be shut out of the benefits by new 
conflicts of interest that may favor the Big Three as well as 
high costs and bias based on their lesser developed track 
  
representative of the credit rating agency industry; and . . . not less than 1 member 
should be an independent member.”). 
 236 See id. § 15E(w)(3). 
 237 See supra note 181. 
 238 See Franken Proposal, supra note 95, § 15E(w)(5). 
 239 See id. (“The [CRA] Board shall . . . evaluate a number of selection 
methods, including a lottery or rotating assignment system . . . . In evaluating a 
selection method . . . the Board shall consider . . . a mechanism which increases or 
decreases assignments based on past performance.”). 
 240 See id. § 15E(w)(7) (“The [CRA] Board shall . . . evaluate the performance 
of each [QNRSRO], . . . at a minimum, [once per year].”). 
 241 See id. § 15E(w)(9) (“Nothing in this section shall prohibit an issuer from 
requesting or receiving additional credit ratings with respect to a debt security, if the 
initial credit rating is provided in accordance with this section.”).  
 242 See supra note 187.  
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records.243 Such a club could simply reentrench the Big Three.244 
The Big Three are concerned that their dominance could be 
eroded in a nonmeritorious way245 and that the CRA Board may 
be plagued by investor biases.246  
None, however, appears to take issue with the CRA 
Board’s rating function—only its ability to use this function to 
allocate ratings business. In fact, many of the NRSROs would 
seem to support the rating function, because it would provide 
investors with a new tool to decide which NRSROs to hold in 
highest esteem.247  
While some of these concerns may be overstated and could 
be addressed in the final rule, the widespread concern over the 
allocating function, especially from the smaller NRSROs, suggests 
that this cure may be worse than the disease.  
  
 243 See, e.g., DBRS Letter, supra note 189, at 8, 14 (discussing CRA Board’s 
conflicts and arguing that the cost of participating in the Franken Proposal’s system 
would discourage all but the largest rating agencies from even trying); see Kroll Letter, 
supra note 231, at 2 (“[W]e question how the Board will evaluate the performance of a 
new NRSRO, such as [Kroll], in a way that enables it to obtain [rating] assignments 
based on merit.”).  
 244 See Kroll Letter, supra note 231, at 2 (“May further entrench the largest 
incumbents”); Coffee, supra note 1, at 258 (“If the Board were to prefer established 
raters with a demonstrated history of rating accuracy, this would largely perpetuate 
the existing oligopoly of the Big Three and might subject the Board to criticism for 
failing to encourage greater competition.”).  
 245 See Letter from Patrick Milano, Exec. Vice President, Operations, 
Standard & Poor’s Ratings Servs., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n 3 
(Sept. 13, 2011) [hereinafter S&P Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-
629/4629-19.pdf (“The [Franken Proposal] would effectively treat ratings as a 
commodity, presuming that all ratings on structured finance products . . . are of equal 
quality and utility.”); see also Bai, supra note 50, at 50 n.9 (quoting Sen. Christopher 
Dodd: “Not all the rating agencies are equal . . . . [T]here are different companies of 
different sizes and needs, and to be choosing rating agencies based on arbitrary choice 
without considering whether or not the rating agency can actually do the job is my 
concern.” (citations omitted)). Others have expressed similar concerns. See Coffee, 
supra note 1, at 258. 
 246 See S&P Letter, supra note 245 (“[T]hose ultimately responsible for 
selecting NRSROs to perform work may have their own biases. . . .”). 
 247 See, e.g., DBRS Letter, supra note 189, at 2 (“These goals are better served 
by measures that . . . give investors the tools they need to make informed choices about 
which credit ratings to employ in making their investment decisions.”); Letter from 
Michel Madelain, President & Chief Operating Officer, Moody’s Investors Serv., to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n 6 (Sept. 13, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 
Moody’s Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-629/4629-23.pdf (“Because 
investors demand credible (i.e. objective, predictive and relatively stable) 
ratings, . . . issuers are motivated to seek ratings from CRAs that have the best 
reputations among investors. . . .”); S&P Letter, supra note 245, at 11-12 (“By selecting 
a capable, well-regarded rating agency with a reputation for independence and 
objectivity, issuers can increase the marketability of their securities.”); Morningstar 
Letter, supra note 186, at 4 (“A Section 15E(w) System that examines ratings accuracy 
and timeliness in the future assignment of ratings will encourage competition among 
NRSROs to provide the most accurate and timely ratings in order to ensure that they 
will continue to secure additional business under the Section 15E(w) System.”). 
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The first benefit of the Franken Proposal is that 
QNRSROs would get a guaranteed percentage of the structured 
finance market for initial ratings. This guaranteed market 
share would prove invaluable to any CRA since structured 
finance products have the proven potential to outpace every 
other type of debt security and, due to their complexity, such 
products command justifiably higher prices.248 On the other 
hand, exclusion from the QNRSRO club could impose a 
substantial burden.  
The Franken Proposal does not explain how the CRA 
Board would initially allocate the guaranteed portion of initial 
ratings business nor how exclusion would be decided.249 In the 
free market, as of year-end 2010, the eight NRSROs registered 
with respect to structured finance products shared the market 
as follows: S&P (38.98 percent), Moody’s (33.57 percent), Fitch 
(21.34 percent), DBRS (3.34 percent), Morningstar (2.75 
percent), A.M. Best (0.02 percent), Egan-Jones (0.00 percent), 
Kroll (0.00 percent).250 While these figures show that the Big 
Three commanded almost 94 percent of this market, such 
dominance does not seem manifestly disproportionate when 
taking into account the disproportionately large staffing that 
the Big Three have compared with the smaller NRSROs. Were 
we to treat the total staff members at these eight agencies 
(3,855)251 as devoted to structured finance ratings only,252 a 
proportionate initial allocation of assignments by the CRA 
Board (assuming all eight were admitted as QNRSROs) vis-à-vis 
staffing would require dividing each agency’s total staff devoted 
  
 248 See Enhancing Investor Protection, supra note 52, at 55 (“[R]ating 
structured finance products generated much higher fees than rating similar amounts of 
corporate bonds. For example, rating a $350 million mortgage pool could justify a fee of 
$200,000 to $250,000, while rating a municipal bond of similar size justified only a fee 
of $50,000.” (citations omitted)); see also Abu Dhabi Comm. Bank v. Morgan Stanley & 
Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155, 167 (S.D.N.Y 2009) (“[T]he Rating Agencies each received fees 
in excess of three times their normal fees for rating the Cheyne SIV . . . .”). 
 249 Eight of today’s ten NRSROs are registered with the SEC with respect to 
structured finance products. See Solicitation of Comment, supra note 95, at 7. Yet only 
a subset of this group might benefit from the guaranteed business afforded by the CRA 
Board’s system to the extent such NRSROs are not selected to be QNRSROs. See supra 
note 236 and accompanying text. 
 250 See SEC SEPT. 2011 SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 47, at 6-7. 
 251 Id. at 8. 
 252 The actual number of credit analysts and supervisors devoted only to 
structured finance is not available. Disclosure on Form NRSRO only requires the total 
number of credit analysts and supervisors and does not distinguish among the five 
ratings categories: financial institutions, insurance companies, corporate issuers, asset-
backed securities (i.e., structured finance), and government securities. See id.; see also 
Form NRSRO, supra note 168, Exhibit 8. 
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to structured finance products by the total staff of all eight 
agencies devoted to the same. This would produce the following 
initial allocations: S&P (34.89 percent), Moody’s (31.23 percent), 
Fitch (27.20 percent), DBRS (2.46 percent), Morningstar (0.62 
percent), A.M. Best (3.11 percent), Egan-Jones (0.13 percent), 
Kroll (0.34 percent). Accordingly, the Big Three’s market share, 
which would equal approximately 93 percent, would not be 
meaningfully diluted. Such an allocation, however, would give 
more work to firms like A.M. Best, Egan-Jones, and Kroll, which 
would help them establish track records for accuracy.  
Since the Franken Proposal does not explain how the 
CRA Board would initially allocate the guaranteed portion of 
initial ratings nor how it would exclude NRSROs, today’s 
NRSROs understandably have concerns. One potential solution 
to this problem would be to equate QNRSROs with those 
NRSROs that are registered to rate structured finance 
products and require that initial allocations be made in 
proportion to staffing resources. Form NRSRO could be 
amended to require the disclosure of the credit analysts and 
supervisors devoted to each rating category.253 The institutional 
and technical capacity test could also be objectified to confirm 
that it is only meant to weed out NRSROs that are patently 
unqualified to rate structured finance products. While the 
smaller NRSROs would likely favor these solutions, the Big 
Three might actually prefer allowing CRA Board discretion since 
it could provide a way for investor representatives to filter out 
NRSROs that the market would not trust. In spite of the Big 
Three’s poor performance during the financial crisis, the market 
has continued to trust the Big Three, so there is practically no 
danger that the Big Three would face exclusion from the 
QNRSRO club.254 The exclusion of the smaller NRSROs would 
impose severe financial and reputational burdens, since they 
would get no market share in initial ratings, which would 
translate into fewer jobs in the market for second ratings.  
The Big Three may also object to allocations in 
proportion to staffing. Even though this would not 
meaningfully dilute their current market share, it would 
encourage smaller NRSROs to hire more credit analysts and 
supervisors in order to take a larger slice of the pie. This would 
potentially erode the Big Three’s market share in a 
  
 253 Cf. supra note 252.  
 254 See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text. 
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nonmeritorious way. Any initial allocation, however, would be 
nonmeritorious since there is not yet an accepted way to 
measure good performance. Merit-based track records for 
accuracy will take time to develop.255  
The second benefit of the Franken Proposal for those in 
the QNRSRO club is that the best-performing QNRSROs would 
be rewarded with bonus assignments on initial ratings. This 
mechanism would directly reward accurate performance and 
would permit any subset of the QNRSROs to dominate the field 
by virtue of their merit.  
While initial allocations based on proportionate staffing 
would not be merit-based, the CRA Board’s ability to adjust 
ratings business in favor of the best performers based on past 
performance addresses the fundamental problem of non-merit-
based allocations. This also addresses any concerns that 
guaranteed business would remove the incentives of the 
NRSROs to work hard and produce rigorous and competitive 
ratings.256 Thus, merit-based allocations would become the new 
norm over time, which would confer a significant benefit on the 
best-performing QNRSROs. While it would also impose a 
burden for the poorer performing QNRSROs, it would provide 
the proper incentives for such QNRSROs to improve their 
performance or be penalized.  
There is legitimate concern, however, that such 
allocations will be unfair due to conflicts of interests or plain 
incompetence. To the extent the CRA Board has subjective 
discretion to allocate ratings, commentators have pointed out 
that at least two new conflicts of interest would be introduced: 
bias in favor of QNRSROs willing to produce more conservative 
investor-friendly ratings (whether or not justified) since the 
CRA Board would be controlled by investors;257 and bias in favor 
of the Big Three since the CRA Board will depend on fees from 
the deepest pockets among the QNRSROs for its continued 
existence.258 While the final rules could mitigate such new 
  
 255 See Letter from Senator Al Franken & Senator Roger F. Wicker, to 
Honorable Mary Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 4 (Sept. 14, 2011), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-629/4629-28.pdf (“Of course, these track 
records would take time to develop. But, over time, it would be possible to effectively 
judge NRSROs on track records of accuracy.”).  
 256 See 2011 Moody’s Letter, supra note 247, at 8 (“[S]uch a system may create 
incentives to conduct the least amount of work and innovation possible to remain in the 
lottery or rotation system.”); see also S&P Letter, supra note 245, at 2. 
 257 See S&P Letter, supra note 245. 
 258 See DBRS Letter, supra note 189, at 8 (“[I]t is likely to cost at least $300-
400 million to operate the Board. Under the best of circumstances, this expense would 
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conflicts by requiring the metrics for such allocations to be 
publicly disclosed and based on objectively verifiable 
performance data, the determination of such metrics is not 
obvious. The CRA Board would undermine its legitimacy if it 
appeared to be plagued by new conflicts of interest. 
Many in the market are concerned, most saliently, that 
the CRA Board would be unqualified to discern what accurate 
performance means and thus could not develop any system to 
reward or penalize QNRSROs based on past performance. For 
example, the Investment Company Institute asked, “[W]hat 
will be the criteria used for determining the ‘best performer’ for 
purposes of assigning a rating agency to a new issue? Is an ‘A1’ 
rating more correct than an ‘A’ rating?”259 The Financial 
Services Roundtable points out that there are no accepted 
performance measures, and if investors’ preferences and the 
CRA Board’s preferences deviate, investors would be stuck 
with bonds rated by NRSROs they do not like.260 S&P altogether 
“rejects the notion that credit ratings can be ‘accurate’ or 
‘inaccurate.’”261 To the extent the CRA Board is not able to 
produce a definition of accuracy that the market accepts, the 
goal of empowering this board to make merit-based allocations 
would be completely compromised.  
At present, some efforts have been made to develop 
methodologies for defining accuracy. Professor Lynn Bai has 
provided one example of standards for discerning accurate 
performance that may be instructive in measuring the 
performance of the various NRSROs and Professor Coffee has 
provided another suggestion.262 In addition, Moody’s has 
  
have to be divided among only four or five rating agencies, and would be in addition to 
the costs of complying with whatever extra layer of regulation Qualified NRSRO status 
might entail. At the end of the day, the cost of participating in the Section 15E(w) 
System would be so high that it would discourage all but the largest rating agencies 
from even trying.” (footnote omitted)).  
 259 156 CONG. REC. S3965, 3979 (daily ed. May 19, 2010) (statement of Sen. 
Christopher Dodd). 
 260 Letter from Richard M. Whiting, Exec. Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Fin. Servs. 
Roundtable, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 15 (Sept. 13, 2011), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-629/4629-16.pdf.  
 261 See S&P Letter, supra note 245, at 11. 
 262 See Bai, supra note 50, at 103 (“The default ratio, ‘fallen angels’ ratio, 
rating change ratio, and large rating change ratio are used to measure rating agencies’ 
performance.”); see also Senate Turmoil Hearings, supra note 49 (Professor Coffee has 
suggested that “[t]he SEC should define what ‘default’ or ‘impaired’ means so as to 
include delayed payments, then calculate these rates over five year cumulative periods, 
and publish its results on its own website. This would enable consumers to engage in a 
simple, one stop comparison. For smaller institutions (e.g., small pension funds, or 
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identified two methods of measuring ratings accuracy: one 
ordinal (meaning relative performance) known as Average 
Position, and the other cardinal (meaning absolute 
performance) such as the “investment-grade default rate and 
the average rating of defaulters prior to default.”263 Bai 
indicates that ratios measuring default, migration from 
investment-grade to non-investment-grade, and stability are 
universally accepted, but other metrics are used without a 
consensus over their value.264 Morningstar has suggested that 
calibrated qualifications “could eliminate any undue influence 
or the necessity for the CRA Board to make any individual 
decisions with regard to particular securitization 
transactions.”265 While such transparency may minimize 
concerns over conflicts of interest, any system seeking to define 
accuracy in a business based on future predictions will 
necessarily come under careful scrutiny, especially by those 
found to be poor performers. This would suggest that, before 
there is a consensus in the market over how to measure 
relative accuracy, any system including an allocating function 
based on accuracy ratings would be premature. 
The final benefit of the Franken Proposal is 
reputational and indirectly financial. Unless the market has 
widespread reason to disagree with the rating abilities of the 
CRA Board, the best-performing QNRSROs would be in a 
better position over time to compete in the market for second 
ratings than excluded NRSROs and non-NRSROs by virtue of 
the reputational capital they would develop from the CRA 
Board’s rankings. By publicly rewarding accuracy and thereby 
communicating to the market a view regarding the agencies 
that would be most likely to produce accurate initial ratings, 
such signals would provide a benchmark for accuracy against 
which the accuracy of second ratings could be tested. This 
would influence the preferences of investment fiduciaries in 
relying on NRSROs, since it would provide insight regarding 
the best performers that is currently hard to identify in the 
market. These preferences, in turn, would influence the hiring 
  
college endowments), the in-house financial staff is often thin and only a simplified 
comparison will enable them to shop effectively.”).  
 263 2011 Moody’s Letter, supra note 247, at annex i. “Our principal measure of 
ratings accuracy is the Average Position (AP) of defaulters. Bounded between 0 and 1, 
AP measures where in the distribution of ratings defaulters were located relative to 
non-defaulters.” Id. 
 264 See Bai, supra note 50, at 79-80. 
 265 Morningstar Letter, supra note 186, at 3. 
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practices of issuers since interest rates on debt securities would 
be affected in their negotiations with underwriters. 
If investment fiduciaries believed in the accuracy of a 
rating, then they would accept an interest rate commensurate 
with the normal range for such rating. If, on the other hand, 
they believed that a rating may be inflated, they would 
justifiably demand a premium on the interest rate above the 
normal range. For example, if an issuer were to hire the worst-
performing QNRSRO (or, alternatively, an excluded NRSRO or 
non-NRSRO) to give a second rating on its securities when it 
could have hired one of the best-performing QNRSROs, 
investment fiduciaries would demand a higher interest rate to 
compensate them for the risk of inflated ratings. They would 
communicate these preferences to underwriters prior to pricing 
and such preferences would get incorporated into the pricing 
negotiations. To avoid this dilemma, issuers would come to 
prefer hiring the best-performing QNRSROs to give second 
ratings since this would undermine any such argument about 
the propriety of a ratings inflation risk premium.  
In this way, the CRA Board’s rating function would 
realign the financial and reputational interests of all QNRSROs 
to favor accuracy. Since the CRA Board would send a signal of 
credibility into the market, all QNRSROs would be encouraged 
to produce the most accurate ratings possible to benefit from this 
signal. Although the poor performers would experience a 
reputational burden, this would only further incentivize them to 
improve their performance. Investment fiduciaries, moreover, 
would generally trust this message since it would come from an 
investor-controlled board. Since only QNRSROs would be 
evaluated, the market would encourage non-NRSROs and 
excluded NRSROs to join the NRSRO and QNRSRO clubs to get 
this reputational benefit. Opting out of either status, by 
contrast, would mean sacrificing such reputational benefit. So 
the rating function would work to keep NRSROs voluntarily 
regulated (since only NRSROs can be QNRSROs) while at the 
same time promoting accurate and reliable ratings.  
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b. Alternatives to the Franken Proposal 
As required by Congress, the SEC is also considering 
five alternative proposals to the Franken Proposal to create 
incentives for NRSROs to compete over accuracy.266  
i. Rely Only on the Existing Equal Access Rule  
The first alternative is to rely only on the existing Equal 
Access Rule implemented in November 2009.267 This rule 
created a mechanism for non-hired NRSROs in the structured 
finance context to gain equal access to the information that 
issuers provide to the NRSROs they hire so that such non-hired 
NRSROs can provide unsolicited second ratings.268  
While this rule allows non-hired NRSROs to compete in 
the market for second ratings, and thereby ostensibly helps the 
lesser known NRSROs develop track records for accuracy, it 
does not provide a financial patron for such activities.269 Thus, 
there is no guarantee that any NRSRO will find it financially 
rational to take advantage of the Equal Access Rule. Indeed, it 
appears that no NRSRO has taken advantage of the rule to 
date.270 Moreover, they would not be encouraged to do so, since 
this regime would not reward accuracy. Issuers would continue 
to provide the primary source of revenue for ratings under this 
system and NRSROs would be encouraged to please such 
issuers even in the unsolicited context so that they could 
potentially gain business from them in the future. Unless this 
rule were coupled with a rating mechanism, such as that 
provided by the Franken Proposal, it would only perpetuate 
today’s race to the bottom, since issuers would still prefer to 
hire NRSROs willing to inflate their ratings, and most 
investment fiduciaries would not have the ability to forcefully 
challenge such preferences.  
Moreover, the enhancements proposed by the various 
supporters of this proposal generally do not attempt to solve 
the problem that non-hired NRSROs cannot afford to give 
  
 266 See supra note 95.  
 267 See supra note 144.  
 268 See supra note 144. 
 269 See Morningstar Letter, supra note 186, at 6 (“We believe that the absence 
of unsolicited initial ratings primarily results from the costs of providing these 
unsolicited ratings without adequate compensation and a lack of interest by arrangers 
and investors in these ratings.”).  
 270 Id.  
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unsolicited ratings for free,271 nor do they propose how market 
actors should distinguish the best-performing NRSROs from 
the worst, which is a task “far beyond the means of many 
insurance companies, pension plans, and other small 
institutional investors.”272 The proposed enhancements are 
generally focused on two points: relaxing a rule that non-hired 
NRSROs must rate one out of every ten deals they review273 and 
allowing the disclosed information, which is currently available 
only to NRSROs, to be made available to all market 
participants (most pertinently, non-NRSROs).274 
Reliance only on the Equal Access Rule is effectively a 
do-nothing approach that does not offer new financial benefits 
to the NRSROs nor a mechanism to promote accurate and 
reliable ratings. Moreover, it imposes a financial burden as a 
condition for competing since lesser established NRSROs would 
need to find separate funding to provide such ratings. One way 
to indirectly get separate funding would be to leave the 
regulatory regime and put such costs savings into unsolicited 
ratings instead. This might be the thinly veiled motivation 
behind the suggestion from some NRSROs that equal access 
should be expanded to non-NRSROs. Thus, adopting this 
proposal may encourage NRSRO Nullification. This proposal, 
subject to the suggested enhancements described above, is 
  
 271 Morningstar appears to be the only exception: it proposes applying the 
Franken Proposal’s framework to the Equal Access Rule such that “NRSROs could be 
selected on a rotational basis to provide an unsolicited rating. . . . [and] NRSROs could 
be compensated on a market-value basis that could represent the average 
compensation paid by the issuer to the Commission or other organization to the other 
credit rating agencies rating the same transaction.” See id. at 7. 
 272 James Lardner, The Ratings Agencies and The Franken Amendment, 
DEMOS (Aug. 1, 2010), http://www.demos.org/publication/rating-agencies-and-franken-
amendment-key-questions-and-answers-0.  
 273 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(e) (2011). See Kroll Letter, supra note 231, at 3 
(suggesting eliminating requirement that one in ten deals reviewed must be rated); 
Letter from Karrie McMillan, Gen. Counsel, Investment Co. Inst., to Elizabeth M. 
Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n 6-7 (Sept. 13, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/4-629/4629-22.pdf (suggesting increasing the number of free peeks from ten 
to twenty-five since a new entrant might find, for example, that it is not qualified to 
review the first twelve issuances it reviews); Letter from Richard A. Dorfman, 
Managing Dir., Head of Securitization, & Christopher B. Killian, Vice President, 
Securitization Grp., Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n (SIFMA), to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n 23 (Sept. 13, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/4-629/4629-9.pdf (suggesting that only one in twenty deals reviewed be 
required to be rated).  
 274 See Kroll Letter, supra note 231, at 3 (suggesting equal access should be 
expanded to all market participants, not just NRSROs); 2011 Moody’s Letter, supra 
note 247, at 2 (same). 
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supported by Moody’s, S&P, Fitch, and Kroll as well as a 
number of other non-CRA entities.275  
ii. Create an Investor-Owned NRSRO 
The second alternative is to create an investor-owned 
NRSRO that would compete with the existing NRSROs. By 
law, issuers would have to obtain initial credit ratings from the 
investor-owned NRSRO and a second issuer-chosen rating from 
one of the existing NRSROs. While this solution divorces issuer 
selection from issuer payment in the initial credit rating 
context by presumably forcing the issuer to pay for a rating 
from the investor-owned NRSRO, it does not do so with respect 
to second ratings. Thus, a monopoly would be created for the 
investor-owned NRSRO in the market for initial ratings while 
a fierce competition would be set into motion in the market for 
second ratings.  
Since the market for initial ratings would be 
monopolized, today’s NRSROs would be denied their current 
market share of initial ratings representing the loss of an 
important financial benefit. Since this model has no 
mechanism to reward accuracy, the market for second ratings 
would be plagued by the same race to the bottom that currently 
exists for all ratings. Issuers (and perhaps investors), 
moreover, would likely distrust the ratings from the investor-
owned NRSRO for a number of reasons: it may have investor 
biases since investors own it, it may lack incentives to do high 
quality work since it would have a monopoly, and it would lack 
an established track record as a newcomer. As a result, such 
ratings would not provide a reliable benchmark for accuracy 
against which the accuracy of second ratings could be tested. 
So this model would remove an important financial benefit 
from today’s NRSROs (the ability to compete for a share of the 
initial credit ratings market), and like the first alternative 
approach, it would not address the conflicts of interest at the 
heart of the rating-agency question. In the comment letters 
sent to the SEC, no commentators supported this proposal.276  
  
 275 See Comments on Solicitation, supra note 187.  
 276 See id. 
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iii. Split the Bill Among Participants 
The third alternative does not clarify whether it would 
permit the issuer to select its preferred NRSRO for initial credit 
ratings. It only focuses on fees by stating,  
an NRSRO would be compensated through transaction fees imposed 
on original issuance and on secondary market transactions. Part of 
the fee would be paid by the issuer or secondary-market seller and 
the other portion of the fee by the investors purchasing the security 
in either the primary or secondary markets.277  
It appears that this model intends to split the bill 
among the issuer, investors, and secondary-market sellers, 
which would presumably mitigate some of the loyalty that the 
NRSROs feel toward the issuer as their sole client. While this 
would partially divorce issuer selection from issuer payment, it 
would not satisfy Congress’s requirement that the issuer and 
issuer-aligned parties may not select the NRSRO that will 
determine and monitor initial credit ratings.278 
Moreover, although this proposal partially mitigates the 
issuer-pays conflict, it does not address the ratings-shopping 
problem if the issuer would ultimately decide which NRSRO to 
choose. Thus, there would still be a race to the bottom since 
this model proposes no mechanism to reward accuracy. As a 
result, the misaligned incentives and today’s status quo would 
persist. This model proposes no other benefits to the NRSROs. 
In the comment letters sent to the SEC, no commentators 
supported this proposal.279  
iv. Institute a User-Pays Model 
The fourth alternative involves the institution of a user-
pays model. Under this model, the issuer would not pay for any 
ratings and the full fee would be allocated to users, defined as 
“any entity that included a rated security, loan, or contract as an 
element of its assets or liabilities as recorded in an audited 
financial statement.”280 Such users would be required to enter 
into a contract with an NRSRO and pay for its rating services.281  
  
 277 See Solicitation of Comment, supra note 95, at 44.  
 278 See supra note 189.  
 279 See Comments on Solicitation, supra note 187.  
 280 See Solicitation of Comment, supra note 95, at 46. 
 281 See id. 
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While forcing investors to buy NRSRO ratings would 
guarantee business to the NRSROs by effectively reinstituting 
a new form of NRSRO-dependent regulatory license, the failure 
of a mechanism to reward accuracy would mean that this 
model would suffer from today’s conflicts of interest in reverse. 
Although it eliminates the issuer-pays conflict, it introduces in 
its place a user-pays conflict and merely reverses the ratings-
shopping problem. Under this model, some users would shop to 
select the NRSROs most willing to deflate (rather than inflate) 
ratings at the lowest prices.282 While this might benefit 
investors in the short term by driving up interest rates on 
relatively safe securities, this type of artificial ratings deflation 
could significantly raise the cost of capital for issuers, which 
could have unforeseen macroeconomic consequences in much 
the same way that artificial ratings inflation did during the 
financial crisis of 2008. Since this model would only offer new 
financial benefits to those NRSROs most willing to please 
investors rather than those most able to produce accurate 
ratings, it would simply flip today’s problems instead of 
address them. In the comment letters sent to the SEC, no 
commentators supported this proposal, although one 
commentator provided a detailed alternative user-fee system.283  
v. Institute an Investor Designation Model 
The fifth alternative would be an investor designation 
model. Under this model, the security holders would select the 
NRSRO or NRSROs that would get paid and the amount of 
payment while the issuer would pay the NRSRO or NRSROs 
according to such directions. This would successfully divorce 
issuer selection from issuer payment in the market for initial 
ratings in keeping with Congress’s mandate. Instead of the 
Franken Proposal’s CRA Board making rating assignments in 
advance to a specific NRSRO, however, the NRSROs would 
choose to do the work before knowing whether they would be 
compensated and, if so, how much. After the work is done, the 
security holders would make the compensation decision “based 
on their perception of [the] research underlying the ratings.”284 
  
 282 See PARTNOY, supra note 62, at 12 (Some institutions “might press the 
rating agencies for lower ratings in hopes of receiving higher returns.”).  
 283 Letter from Jeffrey Manns, Assoc. Professor, George Washington Univ. 
Law Sch. (Sept. 13, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-629/4629-25.pdf.  
 284 See Solicitation of Comment, supra note 95, at 45.  
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They would vote in proportion to their holdings and the 
payment would be made according to such instructions from a 
deposit (presumably equal to the cost of one rating) that the 
issuer would have placed in advance with a third party 
administrator as opposed to the CRA Board under the Franken 
Proposal. There does not appear to be any requirement that the 
security holders would have to consider long-term performance 
data in allocating such payment. 
This model would not only fail to reward accuracy, but 
would also perpetuate the same financial burden that plagues 
the Equal Access Rule: the prospect of uncompensated work. 
Not only would there be no guaranteed minimal level of 
business, but the NRSROs would be asked to spend time and 
resources to produce ratings without any guarantee of payment 
in whole or in part. Moreover, as with the user-pays model, this 
model reverses the ratings-shopping problem by putting the 
payment decision into the hands of interested security holders, 
even though the payment source would be the issuer. Since 
such security holders would not have to consider the long-term 
accuracy of each NRSRO’s rating performance when deciding 
which NRSROs to pay, they would be encouraged to pay the 
NRSROs that have given the most deflated ratings in such 
offering since that would translate into higher interest rates 
benefiting the security holders in the short term. The familiar 
race to the bottom would persist, financial benefits would only 
accrue to those NRSROs able to win the affection of the most 
security holders and one new financial burden (uncompensated 
work) would be imposed. In the comment letters sent to the 
SEC, no commentators supported this proposal.285  
In summary, none of the alternatives to the Franken 
Proposal that the SEC is currently considering would offer 
NRSRO-specific benefits that are comparable to those offered 
by the Franken Proposal: none would guarantee today’s 
NRSROs any particular level of business, reward accurate 
performance through bonus business or provide an investor-
controlled signal of credibility. Nonetheless, most NRSROs are 
concerned that the allocating function would do more harm 
than good, though all would appear to support the rating 
function. While the Equal Access Rule has broader support 
than the Franken Proposal, such support lacks a strong 
foundation since this rule, like the other alternatives proposed, 
  
 285 See Comments on Solicitation, supra note 187.  
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would not promote accurate and reliable ratings or work to 
prevent NRSRO Nullification without being paired with a 
rating feature. While it cannot be known if the adoption of any 
of these alternatives in place of the Franken Proposal would 
cause a tipping point towards NRSRO Nullification, all would 
fall short of the Franken Proposal in preventing it. 
2. The New Standards of Creditworthiness 
Since the SEC’s proposals for the new standards of 
creditworthiness do not require, but only permit, reliance on 
NRSRO credit ratings as part of a broader professional 
judgment analysis, the SEC’s proposed new standards would 
succeed in eliminating the NRSROs’ power to license under the 
federal securities laws since the NRSROs would no longer have 
a mandate to determine creditworthiness. Instead, their 
ratings would become one factor, if a factor at all, in an 
investment fiduciary’s separate credit determination. This 
would effectively shift the responsibility for such credit 
determinations from the NRSROs (to the extent they were 
previously responsible) to the appropriate investment fiduciary 
in each case. Although some market participants have argued 
that the federal agencies would be defying Congress’s intent by 
incorporating any new form of reliance on NRSRO credit 
ratings, voluntary reliance by fiduciaries is not prohibited. 
Congress’s mandate would only prevent the SEC from 
incorporating a “requirement of reliance.”286 Since requiring 
reliance would violate Congress’s intent by effectively 
reinstating regulatory licenses through the back door, I analyze 
the federal agencies’ three other options with respect to the 
incorporation of NRSRO credit ratings into the new standards 
of creditworthiness: prohibiting reliance on NRSRO credit 
ratings, permitting reliance on only NRSRO credit ratings, and 
permitting reliance on any credit ratings.  
The first option, advocated by some, would be to prohibit 
reliance on NRSRO credit ratings altogether under the new 
standards of creditworthiness.287 While the federal agencies 
could hypothetically prohibit such reliance, they would need to 
have an adequate substitute to replace credit ratings. While 
the Free Market Camp has put forward some creative 
possibilities, such as thirty-to-ninety day rolling averages of 
  
 286 Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 939A(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1887 (2010). 
 287 See Better Markets Letter, supra note 194, at 7. 
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credit spreads and credit-default-swap spreads,288 a chorus of 
commentators appears to agree that such market measures 
would not be a sufficient replacement.289 This likely explains the 
shift in the Free Market Camp to a professional judgment 
analysis that would include permissive partial reliance on both 
market measures and credit ratings.290  
The second option would be to permit voluntary reliance 
on only NRSRO credit ratings as part of a professional 
judgment analysis. This would raise the question of whether 
such reliance should be limited to NRSRO credit ratings or 
should apply equally to all credit ratings. If such reliance were 
limited to NRSRO credit ratings only, this would provide a 
significant benefit for the NRSROs, because investment 
fiduciaries seeking to rely in part on credit ratings would be 
limited to only the NRSRO pool. On the downside, however, 
such a policy would discourage upstart CRAs that might have 
the potential to outperform today’s NRSROs. In effect, it would 
reinstate the chicken-and-egg problem that characterized the 
NRSRO designation process prior to 2006.291 In addition, this 
solution might unduly limit the ability of fiduciaries to fulfill 
their legal duties in accordance with their own professional 
judgment. On the one hand, investment fiduciaries would be 
told to take ultimate responsibility for their investment 
decisions; on the other hand, to the extent they rely on ratings, 
they would be told to only rely on NRSRO ratings. This would 
seem inconsistent with the new law’s approach of heightening 
the investment fiduciary’s responsibility. While this solution 
would work to prevent NRSRO Nullification, it would not be in 
sync with the alternative answer to the rating-agency question: 
professional judgment.  
The third option would permit voluntary reliance on any 
credit rating as part of a professional judgment analysis. This 
would achieve the law’s purpose of placing greater 
responsibility on the professional judgment of investment 
fiduciaries and less on NRSROs. By not limiting fiduciaries to 
  
 288 See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 289 See, e.g., Hill, supra note 17, at 143-44 (“Something else is to replace these 
references. . . . The problem is that there is no ready alternative.”); see also Coffee, 
supra note 1, at 233 (“Alternatives to credit ratings, such as credit default swap 
spreads, provide at best only a partial substitute.”); SEC REPORT OF 2003, supra note 9, 
at 39 (“[T]he volatility of credit spreads, their backward-looking nature, and the fact 
that their use would be limited to liquid securities, make them an inferior alternative 
to credit ratings.”). 
 290 See Partnoy, supra note 67, at 16. 
 291 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.  
1074 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:3  
only NRSRO ratings, such fiduciaries would be free to ignore 
credit ratings altogether or rely in part on either NRSRO or 
non-NRSRO ratings as part of their professional judgment 
analysis. Since no adequate substitute for ratings appears to 
exist, most would likely opt to rely in part on the ratings that 
would help produce the highest return and best support for 
such fiduciary’s legal duties.  
This comports with the SEC’s general proposal, which is to 
permit fiduciaries to rely in part on any credit ratings, whether or 
not they are NRSRO credit ratings.292 This levels the playing field 
for NRSROs and non-NRSROs by allowing both to compete to 
produce credit ratings that fiduciaries would want to incorporate 
into their analyses. This would solve the chicken-and-egg problem 
and would be in sync with the new law’s approach of heightening 
the investment fiduciary’s responsibility.  
Such an approach, however, has two potential 
downsides: it might encourage NRSRO Nullification and could 
lead to certain moral hazards. The former could be a potential 
problem because this approach would not distinguish between 
NRSROs and non-NRSROs. To the extent a CRA’s ratings 
would be equally in demand as an NRSRO or non-NRSRO, 
there would be no reason to stay regulated. So any solution 
must counter this incentive. The latter could be a problem since 
it presents the potential moral hazard that investment 
fiduciaries may choose to “cover themselves” by relying blindly 
or purposefully on poor performing NRSROs or non-NRSROs to 
maximize returns. For example, if a fiduciary, such as a money 
market fund manager, is required to invest in only safe 
securities (i.e., highly rated securities), such a fiduciary, in 
breach of his duties, might buy securities with higher yields 
that it believes or should believe are riskier so long as they have 
the desired safety rating given by some CRA.293 In good times, if 
such securities do not default, a fund manager would appear to 
be outperforming his competitors. In bad times, however, such a 
fund manager might experience large losses and seek to deflect 
blame under the cover of a “diligent analysis” and partial 
reliance on credit ratings commensurate with safety. While a 
professional judgment test is supposed to prevent excessive risk 
taking by requiring reliance on other factors in addition to credit 
  
 292 See supra note 196. 
 293 See Coffee, supra note 1, at 259 (“[T]here is the even more sinister danger 
that many institutions (in particular, money market funds) wanted inflated ratings so 
that they could earn the higher returns from riskier securities.”). 
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ratings, it is not supposed to end risk taking altogether. Proving 
a breach of fiduciary duty under these circumstances would be 
very hard since the principals would have no way of checking 
the professional judgment analysis of their fiduciaries and 
courts would not want to second-guess private decision making 
fraught with inherent risks.294  
Interestingly, the rating function from the Franken 
Proposal could provide a potential solution to both NRSRO 
Nullification and the moral hazard problems described above. 
To the extent that the rater only evaluated the disclosed 
performance statistics of NRSROs (and not non-NRSROs) to 
tell fiduciaries and ultimate investors which NRSROs are the 
best performers, this would work against NRSRO Nullification 
by causing such fiduciaries to prefer NRSRO over non-NRSRO 
ratings since the accuracy of the former would be better known 
to the market. To the extent non-NRSROs would not be rated, 
they would not benefit from the rater’s reputational signal. 
This would work to negate NRSRO Nullification and encourage 
NRSRO registration since any perceived incentive to leave the 
regulatory regime would be undermined by the reputational 
benefit a CRA could get through a rating.  
Such a rater could also mitigate the moral hazard of 
investment fiduciaries choosing to rely on poor performing 
NRSROs and non-NRSROs to maximize their returns. Since 
the rater would be opining about which NRSROs are the best 
performers, investment fiduciaries choosing to ignore such 
opinions may strike up suspicion among their ultimate 
investors. Certifying agreement with the rater’s methodology 
for defining accuracy and acting in accordance with such 
opinions, by contrast, would send the opposite message to 
investors. However, an investment fiduciary eager to show it is 
not blindly relying on either credit ratings or the rater may 
  
 294 Traditionally the business judgment rule has protected the investment 
decisions of fiduciaries relying on investment grade ratings, though this reliance 
defense may be weakened now. See id. at 266 (“Today, if a money market fund’s board 
suffers a major loss on an investment, it will very likely be protected by the business 
judgment rule (and not be held liable) if an NRSRO ratings agency gave the flawed 
security an investment grade rating.”). But see PARTNOY, supra note 62, at 6 (“The 
accountability of NRSROs has deteriorated so much that institutional investors now 
are vulnerable if they rely on credit ratings in making investment decisions. To the 
extent rating agencies are not subject to liability, an institutional investor’s defense of 
reliance on ratings is weakened, because constituents can argue that ratings are less 
reliable when rating agencies are not accountable for fraudulent or reckless ratings.”). 
Nonetheless, so long as they have done some private due diligence in addition to 
relying on credit ratings and have a rational basis for their decision, proving a breach 
of the duties of care or loyalty would likely be hard to do. 
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have good reason to ignore such signal. In the case of 
disagreement with the rater’s methodology, the SEC could 
require that investment fiduciaries explain their reasons for 
relying on ratings from non-NRSROs and ratings from those 
NRSROs that the rater considers to be poor performers. This 
would create a market-based countermechanism to check the 
methodology of the rater and would work against blind reliance 
on the opinions of such a rater. A requirement that agreement 
with such methodology must be certified would similarly work 
against blind reliance. By combining freedom to rely on any 
ratings with a requirement that agreement with the rater’s 
methodology for determining accuracy be certified and 
disagreements with the rater’s methodology or reliance on non-
NRSROs be explained, the law’s purpose of heightening the 
investment fiduciaries’ responsibility would be achieved. It 
would also mitigate the potential moral hazard because 
investment fiduciaries would have to justify their reliance on 
either the rater’s pronouncements or their own dissenting 
conclusions in order to satisfy their legal duties.  
In sum, while the SEC’s proposals for the content of the 
new standards of creditworthiness would substantially eliminate 
an important NRSRO-specific financial benefit on the federal 
level (NRSRO-dependent regulatory licenses), permissible 
reliance on such ratings as part of a broader professional 
judgment analysis preserves the opportunity for NRSROs to still 
capture much of this benefit, even if investment fiduciaries can 
equally rely on non-NRSRO ratings. Moreover, there appear to 
be ways to heighten the responsibility of investment fiduciaries 
without encouraging NRSRO Nullification or otherwise 
encouraging fiduciaries to take excessive risks that would be 
contrary to the interests of their principals.  
3. Existing Distinctions  
At present, there is a sufficient equilibrium between the 
benefits and burdens of NRSRO status that has kept today’s 
NRSROs from surrendering their NRSRO status, even though 
some non-NRSROs have chosen not to join the club as a result 
of the current balance. In assessing whether the impact of 
today’s most critical unresolved items will cause a tipping point 
toward NRSRO Nullification, the existing benefits and burdens 
of NRSRO status must be taken into account. The two primary 
NRSRO-specific benefits that remain are reputational, and 
financial benefits by virtue of the message an NRSRO sends to 
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the market in being regulated and the persistence of NRSRO-
specific regulatory licenses. The Equal Access Rule also 
provides an informational benefit to NRSROs. In addition, two 
primary NRSRO-specific burdens also remain in the form of 
the costs of being regulated and heightened liability exposure 
as a result of the SEC’s enhanced penalty powers and exposure 
to private rights of action. While these benefits and burdens 
appear to sufficiently cancel each other out at the present, they 
could become increasingly important in concert with the 
resolution of today’s most critical unresolved items.  
First, all ten NRSROs derive an intangible reputational 
benefit from the message that regulation sends to the market. 
This benefit, however, would be more valuable to the Big Three 
than the other seven NRSROs because Ratings Reform was put 
into place on account of the Big Three’s past performance. 
Moreover, the Big Three, unlike the other seven, have been 
subject to widespread negative media attention as a result of 
their role as major culprits in the lead-up to the financial crisis 
of 2008. Ratings Reform therefore signals the return of the 
watchdog, which has likely restored a good deal of investor 
confidence in the Big Three. Therefore, were any of the Big 
Three to leave the regulatory regime, this would produce 
headline news that might lead to a public outcry. Since such an 
outcry could severely damage or destroy the Big Three’s 
reputations, it would be unlikely that they would risk NRSRO 
Nullification even if the costs of remaining regulated were 
high. Thus, for the Big Three, the reputational benefits of 
regulation weigh heavily against NRSRO Nullification.  
By contrast, Ratings Reform was not put into place for 
the other seven, nor have they received much criticism or 
media attention. If any of the other seven opted out of Ratings 
Reform, the public would be unlikely to react strongly, if at all. 
The public may not appreciate the important role that the 
other seven play in mitigating the importance of the Big Three. 
As a result, the reputational benefits of remaining regulated 
would weigh considerably less in any calculation favoring 
NRSRO Nullification by the other seven NRSROs than it would 
for the Big Three. 
Second, all ten NRSROs have the opportunity to derive 
financial benefits from all pre-Dodd-Frank regulatory licenses 
through July 2012 and such remaining regulatory licenses 
(which are mostly on the state and private levels) thereafter. 
This benefit too, however, is more valuable to the Big Three 
than the other seven. In spite of the Big Three’s poor 
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performance during the recent financial crisis, “sticky”295 
market practices suggest that the Big Three will continue to be 
the primary beneficiaries of such regulatory licenses unless a 
rater is put in place to send clear signals that better performers 
should be hired instead. In the absence of a rater or the 
Franken Proposal’s CRA Board, there would be few new 
opportunities for the smaller seven to gain market share. To 
the extent the smaller seven could do comparably good 
business outside of the regulatory regime, the existence of some 
fraction of today’s NRSRO-specific regulatory licenses may not 
stop them from opting out.  
Third, all ten NRSROs have the opportunity to benefit 
from the Equal Access Rule. This rule, however, is meant to 
favor the smaller seven over the Big Three. Since it provides 
equal information to non-hired NRSROs, it is supposed to level 
the playing field for the smaller seven since they are hired less 
frequently than the Big Three. In reality, it has only provided a 
marginal benefit, if any benefit, since taking advantage of the 
rule has not been cost effective.296  
Fourth, all ten NRSROs must pay the cost of complying 
with Dodd-Frank’s heightened regulatory regime, whereas non-
NRSROs are exempt from these costs. This burden also applies 
differently to the Big Three and other seven NRSROs since the 
Big Three, as bigger companies, have larger economies of scale 
to afford such expenses. For the smaller NRSROs, such costs 
are therefore relatively higher. As a result, NRSRO 
Nullification would be more attractive in respect of the 
compliance cost savings for the smaller seven NRSROs than for 
the Big Three. So this factor, too, would more readily drive the 
other seven to NRSRO Nullification than any of the Big Three.  
On balance, the current equilibrium suggests that the 
seven smaller NRSROs are in a more fragile position than the 
Big Three with respect to NRSRO Nullification. While many of 
these seven have fought hard for many years to gain NRSRO 
status, it was more valuable in the past than it is now. 
Although a sufficient equilibrium currently exists to keep such 
NRSROs regulated, the resolution of the most critical 
unresolved items could tip today’s balance, especially with 
respect to the seven smallest NRSROs, if the burdens continue 
to increase and the benefits continue to decrease. 
  
 295 See Hill, supra note 17, at 144. 
 296 See supra note 186.  
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B. Legal Implications 
In addition to the financial and reputational 
implications discussed above, the NRSROs would not withdraw 
from the regulatory regime unless it made legal sense. There 
are two potential legal implications of NRSRO Nullification 
that may work to deter its exercise: forced registration and 
regulation under the Advisers Act, and new legislation to force 
registration and regulation under Ratings Reform. 
To the extent that any subset of the NRSROs left the 
Ratings Reform regime, the SEC could force registration and 
regulation under the Advisers Act without requiring new 
legislation. This, however, would be undesirable. First, prior to 
CRARA, the SEC and the case law both took the position that 
CRAs were not required to be registered as investment 
advisers.297 Second, while CRARA only granted an exemption 
from the Advisers Act to NRSROs, the SEC has not mandated 
that any non-NRSROs register under the Advisers Act.298 Third, 
the Advisers Act was almost completely ineffective in terms of 
regulating the NRSROs prior to CRARA.299 Thus, even though 
withdrawal from NRSRO status might open the door to 
capturing such newly minted non-NRSROs under the term 
“investment adviser,”300 doing so would not replicate the 
intended benefits to society of Ratings Reform—accurate and 
reliable ratings—and therefore would not be desirable.  
A second possibility is forced registration and regulation 
under Ratings Reform. While this would require new legislation, 
it would be a more desirable option than Advisors Act 
regulation. Congress could supplement the NRSROs’ voluntary 
withdrawal right and the CRAs’ voluntary registration right by 
adopting a mandatory NRSRO registration requirement based 
on external criteria. Such a requirement could force the CRAs 
meeting specified criteria to register (or stay registered) and 
thereby capture such agencies within the web of Ratings 
Reform. This would mean that NRSROs would not only have to 
  
 297 See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text. 
 298 Based on multiple investment adviser searches on the SEC website, it appears 
that non-NRSROs do not register as investment advisers. For example, neither Rapid 
Ratings, Pacific Credit Ratings, Global Credit Ratings, nor Dagong are registered as 
investment advisers. The keyword “rating” produces no results corresponding to any of 
today’s non-NRSROs. See Investment Adviser Search, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.adviserinfo.sec.gov/(S(feasnj50jnhzmaljbhw4goio))/IAPD/Content/Search/iapd_S
earch.aspx (last visited Jan. 18, 2012).  
 299 See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.  
 300 See supra note 176. 
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accept the financial, reputational and legal burdens that exist 
today, but they might also be prevented from avoiding new 
burdens adopted in the future. This could serve to reverse or 
prevent NRSRO Nullification. 
But how far can the government reach in forcing 
regulation upon CRAs that are non-NRSROs? Under 
Congress’s commerce power, it can regulate “the use of the 
channels of interstate commerce . . . the instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate 
commerce, . . . [and] those activities having a substantial 
relation to interstate commerce.”301 Thus, Congress could not 
reach (nor would it want to reach) all of the approximately 
seventy-six global non-NRSROs, since most are foreign entities 
that operate primarily outside of the jurisdiction of the United 
States.302 For those non-NRSROs that rate debt securities 
traded within the United States, however, Congress would 
likely have wide latitude in imposing Ratings Reform if it chose 
to do so, especially since there would be no First Amendment 
concerns.303 Whether or not ratings themselves propose 
commercial transactions,304 they become indelibly linked with 
commercial transactions (the sale of debt securities) that form 
a part of the core of American capitalism. Especially in light of 
the role of credit ratings in the financial crisis of 2008, it is 
likely beyond debate that credit ratings substantially affect 
interstate commerce. Moreover, Congress has explicitly found 
that “the activities of credit ratings agencies are fundamentally 
commercial in character.”305 While the courts do not always 
afford deference to Congress’s findings with respect to 
  
 301 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995). 
 302 For example, Peru’s Pacific Credit Ratings operates primarily in Latin 
America. See PCR: PAC. CREDIT RATING, http://www.ratingspcr.com/acerca.php (last 
visited Aug. 14, 2011) (“We operate in Latin America . . . .”). South Africa’s Global 
Credit Ratings Co. operates primarily in Africa, though it is seeking to expand to other 
non-U.S. markets. See Global Credit Rating Co., FIN. MKTS. DIRECTORY, 
http://www.fmd.co.za/data/M01732/M01732.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2012) (“Having 
firmly established a market leadership position in Africa, a major thrust has been to 
establish a similar position in South America, Eastern Europe, Asia and the Middle 
East, via a combination of acquisitions, alliances, and organic growth.”).  
 303 Ratings Reform does not reach the content of CRA speech. See supra note 174. 
 304 Some have argued in the commercial speech context that credit ratings are 
merely opinions about commercial transactions that do not themselves propose 
commercial transactions. See, e.g., Letter from Laurence H. Tribe & Thomas C. Goldstein, 
Legal Consultants, to Moody’s Investors Serv., supra note 123, at 2 (“NRSRO 
ratings . . . are independent evaluations that do not propose any transaction.”). 
 305 See Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 931, 124 Stat. 1376, 1872 (2010). 
2012] NRSRO NULLIFICATION 1081 
commerce,306 any CRA that rates debt securities traded within 
the United States would be fighting an uphill battle to 
challenge prospective legislation on the basis that its ratings 
are noneconomic activity (i.e., merely speech) that do not 
substantially affect interstate commerce.  
Furthermore, the securities laws already include 
precedents for such mandatory requirements. For example, every 
issuer engaged in interstate commerce, in a business affecting 
interstate commerce, or whose securities are traded by any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce can be captured by the 
public company reporting rules by the mere existence of two 
external criteria: total assets exceeding $1 million and a class of 
equity securities held by five hundred or more holders.307 
Similarly, beneficial owners of equity securities of public 
companies can be forced to make certain disclosures by merely 
exceeding a 5 percent ownership threshold.308  
By analogy, Congress could devise similar legislation 
based on one of these two precedents to similarly capture CRAs 
in the web of Ratings Reform based on external criteria. For 
example, Congress could put into place a ratings market share 
threshold expressed as a percentage of total outstanding ratings 
in each ratings class (similar to the 5 percent beneficial 
ownership threshold)309 or a fixed number based on total ratings 
outstanding in each ratings class (similar to the public company 
reporting threshold).310 This way, the requirement would only 
force registration and regulation for those CRAs producing more 
than a de minimis number of ratings in each class.  
Currently, the SEC has identified five different rating 
classes: financial institutions, insurance companies, 
corporations, asset-backed securities (i.e., structured finance 
products), and government, sovereign, and municipal 
securities.311 As of year-end 2010, each of the Big Three rated 
  
 306 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000) (limiting 
Congress’s ability to regulate noneconomic activity based on congressional findings 
that it created a substantial effect on interstate commerce). 
 307 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 12(g), 13(a), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78l(g), 
78m(a) (West 2011). The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), which was 
signed into law on April 5, 2012, alters the thresholds that trigger registration of an issuer’s 
securities under Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, including a different 
threshold for banks and bank holding companies. See Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 501, 601, 126 
Stat. 306 (2012). 
 308 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d). 
 309 See id. 
 310 See id. §§ 78l(g), 78m(a). 
 311 See id. § 78c(a)(62)(B).  
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more than 1,600 debt securities in each ratings class and held at 
least 8 percent of the market share of each ratings class.312 While 
A.M. Best had approximately 26 percent of the market in 
insurance company ratings, no other NRSRO had more than 8 
percent of the market in any other ratings class and only two 
other NRSROs (DBRS and Kroll) held more than 7 percent in a 
different rating class.313 In each ratings class, however, at least 
five NRSROs rated one hundred or more debt securities, and at 
least four NRSROs rated one thousand or more debt securities.314  
These statistics, however, do not include non-NRSRO 
ratings and therefore do not reflect the entire universe of CRA 
credit ratings. Thus, to the extent Congress seeks to adopt such 
a mandatory NRSRO registration requirement based on 
external criteria, it would need to gather information about total 
outstanding ratings in each class from all CRAs engaged in 
interstate commerce or affecting interstate commerce. From 
these figures, it could devise a threshold meant to require at 
least four or five CRAs in each class to register as NRSROs such 
that there would be sufficient competition and comparative data 
available in each ratings class to dampen the impact that the 
Big Three could have on any segment of the market.  
Using the figures from the SEC’s most recent summary 
report on NRSROs315 and treating them as the entire universe 
of CRA credit ratings for illustrative purposes, a percentage 
threshold of outstanding ratings in each class would need to be 
set at 0.05 percent for each ratings class in order to capture 
five CRAs in each class and 0.06 percent for each ratings class 
in order to capture four CRAs in each class. If a fixed number 
threshold is used instead, one hundred credit ratings in each 
ratings class would capture five CRAs in each class, while one 
thousand credit ratings would capture four in each class.  
While such a threshold would close the voluntary 
registration and withdrawal loophole by preventing or reversing 
NRSRO Nullification, it would not address the underlying goal 
of Ratings Reform to encourage accurate and reliable ratings. 
Therefore, to the extent Congress considers adopting a 
mandatory registration requirement based on external criteria, 
it must also couple any such measures with a mechanism, such 
  
 312 See SEC SEPT. 2011 SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 47, at 6-7. 
 313 Id. 
 314 Id. 
 315 See id. 
2012] NRSRO NULLIFICATION 1083 
as the rating function of the Franken Proposal’s CRA Board, to 
promote accurate and reliable credit ratings. 
In summation, the most critical items that remain 
unresolved—the Franken Proposal and the new standards of 
creditworthiness—in concert with existing distinctions based on 
NRSRO status could lead to a tipping point in favor of NRSRO 
Nullification for at least some of today’s NRSROs to the extent 
these measures continue to increase NRSRO-specific burdens 
without providing NRSRO-specific benefits. The resolution of 
these items could also prevent NRSRO Nullification if they 
provide sufficient benefits to avoid the tipping point. Congress 
could prevent or reverse NRSRO Nullification by adopting a 
mandatory NRSRO registration requirement based on external 
criteria that could force regulation upon a sufficient segment of 
the CRAs to keep Ratings Reform intact, but this would only be 
a partial solution since it would not, by itself, promote accurate 
and reliable ratings. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS  
In this final part, I present my central recommendation 
for resolving the Franken Proposal and new standards of 
creditworthiness in consonance with the dual goals of 
promoting accurate and reliable ratings and preventing 
NRSRO Nullification: the SEC should adopt a refined version 
of the rating function suggested by the Franken Proposal—but 
not the allocating function. In addition, the SEC should adopt 
its current proposal to permit partial reliance by investment 
fiduciaries on any credit ratings under the new standards of 
creditworthiness, subject to one additional requirement: 
investment fiduciaries seeking to rely on NRSROs that the 
rater deems good performers must certify agreement with the 
rater’s methodology for defining accuracy, while investment 
fiduciaries seeking to rely on non-NRSROs or NRSROs that the 
rater deems poor performers must publicly explain their 
disagreement with the rater’s methodology or show why certain 
non-NRSROs, when compared with NRSROs, produce ratings 
of equal or better quality. Under this proposal, it will not be 
necessary to close the voluntary registration loophole through a 
mandatory registration requirement. 
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A. Create a Rater of the NRSROs, Not a Rater and an 
Allocator  
My central recommendation is that the SEC should 
create a rater of the NRSROs, not a rater and an allocator.316 
The Franken proposal, by contrast, would put both functions in 
place. This would avoid the difficult problems created by the 
allocating function, which function is generally opposed by the 
precise constituents it is meant to support—the smaller 
NRSROs. These problems include how to choose the QNRSRO 
club’s membership and how to allocate on a meritorious basis 
without becoming subject to conflicts of interest or choosing a 
system that the market thinks is wrong. The rating function, 
on the other hand, which serves the same underlying goals, 
would likely find widespread acceptance.  
To the extent that the allocating function may 
eventually be appropriate, there is one primary reason that it 
is currently premature: there is no consensus on how to 
measure the relative accuracy of one NRSRO’s performance 
against another’s. The Franken Proposal’s CRA Board, 
however, would be well positioned to credibly develop a set of 
such metrics and to test their acceptance in the market. This is 
because, as a board controlled by investor representatives, it 
would be naturally aligned with the interests of investment 
fiduciaries and ultimate investors. 
A distinction nonetheless must be drawn between using 
such metrics to influence the market and using them to make 
the market. The rating function would have the effect of doing 
the former, while the allocating function would have the effect 
of doing the latter. Since it is predictable that some investment 
  
 316 It must be acknowledged that this recommendation has also been 
advanced by Professor Lynn Bai and Senators Carl Levin and Tom Coburn. See Bai, 
supra note 50, at 101 (“[T]he Franken Proposal should be modified in a way such that 
the primary function of its board would be not to allocate rating jobs for the credit 
rating industry, but to closely monitor and rank the performances of its players and 
make this information freely accessible to the investment community.”); see also CARL 
LEVIN, CHAIRMAN & TOM COBURN, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, U.S. PERMANENT 
SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS: COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOV’T AFFAIRS, WALL 
STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 316 (Apr. 13, 2011) 
available at http://www.ft.com/cms/fc7d55c8-661a-11e0-9d40-00144feab49a.pdf (“The SEC 
should use its regulatory authority to rank the Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations in terms of performance, in particular the accuracy of their ratings.”). To this 
author’s knowledge, the ratings inflation risk premium hypothesized in this article that 
would motivate issuers to prefer hiring the better performing NRSROs on account of 
the rater’s pronouncements is a novel rationale for this recommendation. 
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fiduciaries will disagree with whatever metrics are proposed by 
the CRA Board, such disagreements should also be given room 
to be tested in the market. Over time, there may be a 
convergence over the best available methods for ranking 
NRSROs based on accurate ratings. Since none yet exists, the 
allocating function should not yet be adopted.  
The rating function, on the other hand, should be 
adopted because, standing alone, it would nonetheless promote 
accurate and reliable ratings. It would do this by putting 
investment fiduciaries in a stronger position to influence the 
hiring decisions of issuers. Although only the allocating 
function would directly address the issuer-pays conflict by 
separating issuer payment of the NRSRO from issuer 
selection,317 the rating function would put information into the 
market that does not currently exist about which NRSROs are 
the best performers.318 Investment fiduciaries, through 
underwriters, could use this information during pricing 
negotiations to penalize issuers for choosing poor performing 
NRSROs or non-NRSROs. They could demand an interest rate 
premium to compensate them for ratings inflation risk. To 
avoid paying such a premium, issuers would come to prefer 
hiring the most accurate performers since this would 
undermine any argument that such a ratings inflation risk 
premium would be appropriate. This would change the game 
because rating accurately, instead of rating generously, would 
become good business.  
The rating function would also work to prevent NRSRO 
Nullification so long as the rater only rated NRSROs and not non-
NRSROs, took into account all NRSRO ratings (i.e., solicited and 
unsolicited) and made such accuracy ratings, including the 
metrics used, publicly available. Such refinements could easily be 
  
 317 Cf. supra note 189. 
 318 It must be observed that, independent of whether the SEC creates a rater to 
interpret performance data, it is requiring the disclosure of such data. See supra note 219 
and accompanying text. This will allow investors to analyze the same data as any such 
rater and thereby develop competing accuracy rankings, which is likely a daunting and 
meticulous task. This author hypothesizes that the interplay between the rater and the 
market’s check and balance on the rater is the best way to create a consensus over the 
meaning of relative accuracy. In the absence of a rater and a requirement that investors 
double-check the rater’s methodologies, investors may not have sufficient motivation to 
develop in-house views about which CRAs are the best performers in spite of the new 
disclosure requirements. Even if sufficient motivation exists for investors to compete 
among themselves to create accuracy rankings, the various conclusions of innumerable 
investors may be too scattered to meaningfully influence the hiring decisions of issuers. A 
rater would help focus the debate about which CRAs are the best performers by providing 
an objective benchmark on behalf of all investors.  
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built into the Franken Proposal’s current architecture. This would 
add significant value to becoming an NRSRO because it would 
allow agencies to credibly distinguish themselves based upon 
their superior ability to rate accurately. This would produce more 
market visibility and more business for the best performers. 
Opting out of NRSRO status, by contrast, would mean losing this 
important benefit.  
Since the other alternatives that the SEC is considering 
have no mechanism to promote accurate and reliable ratings 
nor would they work to prevent NRSRO Nullification, a 
modified form of the Franken Proposal adopting only this 
refined rating mechanism is justified.  
B. Permit Partial Ratings Reliance Under the New 
Standards  
In addition, the SEC should adopt its current proposal to 
permit partial reliance by investment fiduciaries on any credit 
ratings under the new standards of creditworthiness subject to 
one additional requirement: investment fiduciaries seeking to 
rely on NRSROs that the rater deems good performers must 
certify agreement with the rater’s methodology for defining 
accuracy, while investment fiduciaries seeking to rely on non-
NRSROs or NRSROs that the rater deems poor performers must 
publicly explain their disagreement with the rater’s methodology 
or show why certain non-NRSROs, when compared with 
NRSROs, produce ratings of equal or better quality.  
Partial reliance on credit ratings is necessary because 
there is no adequate substitute in the market to replace credit 
ratings. Investment fiduciaries, moreover, should not be 
limited to considering only NRSRO ratings because this would 
undermine the law’s purpose in shifting responsibility for 
determining creditworthiness from the NRSROs to the relevant 
investment fiduciary in each case. Since the rater I propose 
would only rate NRSROs, and not non-NRSROs, this limitation 
should negate any perverse incentives by the NRSROs to opt 
out of the regulatory regime simply because investment 
fiduciaries would be permitted to rely on non-NRSRO ratings.  
My proposal would also promote accurate and reliable 
ratings. By requiring investment fiduciaries to certify agreement 
with the rater’s methodology for defining accuracy or to explain 
disagreements with the rater’s methodology or reliance on non-
NRSROs, a countermechanism would be introduced into the 
market to check such rater’s pronouncements. This would directly 
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address the Franken Proposal’s most serious flaw: the allocation 
of ratings business based on an accuracy standard that the 
market does not accept. This “certify or explain” rule would 
harness the professional judgment of investment fiduciaries in 
the service of accuracy. While there is currently no accepted 
definition of accuracy in the market, the collective effort of the 
rater and the community of investment fiduciaries will help bring 
one into existence. At the same time, it will work against the 
moral hazards that investment fiduciaries may be relying blindly 
on the opinions of the rater or ignoring its signals with impunity. 
C. Consider Closing the Loophole 
Finally, given this article’s focus on the threat posed by 
the NRSROs’ voluntary withdrawal right, it is necessary to 
consider whether this voluntary registration and withdrawal 
loophole should simply be closed. While I assess this possibility 
elsewhere,319 under the central recommendation I advance, closing 
the voluntary registration and withdrawal loophole by adopting a 
mandatory registration requirement is not necessary because a 
rater will produce sufficient financial and reputational benefits 
for today’s NRSROs to prevent NRSRO Nullification. While 
closing the loophole would be an even more definitive way of 
preventing NRSRO Nullification, it would not work to promote 
accurate and reliable ratings by itself and would therefore only be 
a partial solution. In addition, closing the loophole would require 
new legislation by Congress, whereas my central recommendation 
only requires action on the part of the SEC. There is value, in any 
event, to leaving this particular loophole open: it sends a signal to 
the NRSROs to stay voluntarily regulated because mandatory 
regulation is always looming as an option.  
  
 319 See supra Part III.A.3.  
